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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Resources, Institutions, and Development across U.S. States
Joab N. Corey
This dissertation is a collection of papers examining the relationship between resource
intensity, institutional quality, and economic development across the United States. The
first chapter introduces the empirical connection between high levels of resource
abundance and low levels of economic development known as the resource curse. It then
proceeds to briefly introduce the three papers that make up the next three chapters of the
dissertation. Chapter two examines the formation of low-quality institutions in areas with
a large amount of natural resources. It begins by providing a theoretical model to show
that governments will execute more expropriative tax policies in areas with a high level
of immobile natural resources. The chapter then examines the state constitution of
Wyoming, an incredibly resource intense state with prior knowledge of these resources
before the formation of their state government, to find that this constitution is consistent
with that of a low quality institution that could hinder economic development. This
chapter also provides a simple econometric model to show that governments will form
more quickly in high-resource areas where there is a greater level of wealth to
expropriate. Chapter 3 examines the link between natural resource abundance and the
size of governments. Large governments tend to be consistent with high levels of rentseeking and unproductive entrepreneurship that can hurt economic development. This
chapter finds that resource intense states have larger and more economically intrusive
governments across several specifications and measures for government size. Chapter
four looks at the interaction between low quality institutions, resource abundance, and
economic development. This study finds that natural resource endowment only hurts
growth in those states with poor institutions, while it can actually enhance growth in
those states with productive institutions. Chapter five concludes and discusses areas of
future research.
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Chapter 1
Resources, Institutions, and Economic Development

1.1 Introduction
The inverse relationship between natural resource abundance and economic development
is now referred to as the resource curse. This correlation was first examined at the
international level with the seminal work of Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001). Since this
seemingly paradoxical relationship was first discovered, there has been an extensive
effort to find what drives this inverse connection across countries. Sachs and Warner
(2001) generalize these explanations by saying that resources crowd out factors that are
important for growth and since there is debate about what causes growth, there is debate
about what causes the resource curse.
Several studies have concluded that there is an institutional channel through
which the resource curse operates. One such explanation is that resource abundance
causes the population to have greater expectations regarding growth and development,
which increases the pressure placed on the government causing them to make hasty and
overly-intrusive policies that will have negative ramifications on the economy (Stevens,
2005). For example, natural resource abundance may cause the government to channel
investments away from other profitable growth-enhancing sectors, engage in poor
industrial policy, and establish transfers and subsidies while restricting free trade.
Additionally, resource abundance has been shown to lead to poor institutional quality
and, thus, lower economic growth through the channels of increased corruption and rentseeking. This result was supported by Isham, Woocock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005) who
found that rent-seeking and corruption was more greatly affected by immobile point
1

resources, which are minerals and fuels that must be mined from the ground, than by
diffuse resources such as agriculture which can be moved in response to lower
institutional quality. Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005), also concluded that point
resources are more likely to adversely affect the economy through the indirect channel of
institutional quality. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) also examined the effect of the
interaction between institutional quality and resource abundance on economic
development and found that the resource curse only exists in those economies with poor
institutions.
Much of the research conducted on the resource curse thus far has been focused at
the international level. Only recently has the analysis of the resource curse turned to the
sub-national level by focusing on the United States. This is somewhat surprising as the
United States provides a fertile ground for the examination of the effects of resource
abundance since states are endowed with different levels of natural resource abundance,
are governed by different state institutions, and have different levels of economic growth.
Further, U.S. data is not subject to as many problems as international data. All states use
the same currency so the effect of natural resource abundance on terms of trade
(commonly know as Dutch Disease) can be eliminated as a possible explanation. States
also have more similar cultures and military history as compared to different countries
and this can help eliminate these variables, which are otherwise difficult to measure, as a
potential explanation. Finally, U.S. data is more consistent in that the same variables are
measured in the same way across the same time period, whereas international data is
more subject to inaccurate, inconsistent, or unavailable records.
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Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) provided the first examination of the resource
curse across the United States by analyzing the indirect transmission channels of resource
abundance. They found that resource abundance leads to lower levels of investment,
schooling, openness, and research and development, while increasing corruption. Dunn
(2008) begins to examine the institutional connection by providing both theoretical and
empirical support that resource abundance will lead to higher levels of rent-seeking
through the use of the severance tax across U.S. States. The idea that increased rentseeking can crowd out productive activity and, thus, negatively impact growth is
consistent with Baumol’s theory of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship
(Baumol, 1990). This dissertation further extends the analysis of the institutional
connection between resource abundance and low economic development across U.S.
States.
The second chapter of this dissertation examines the formation of governments in
areas of resource abundance by analyzing the constitution of the state of Wyoming,
which was aware of its resource abundance at the time in which it formed its constitution
and subsequent state government. This chapter also includes a simple empirical model,
which shows that governments formed more quickly in those areas with a known
abundance of natural resource wealth available to expropriate. The third chapter uses an
empirical model to show that those state with a greater amount of natural resources have
more intrusive governments consistent with more unproductive entrepreneurship as
exhibited by a lower score in the area of the Economic Freedom of North America Index
which measures government size and transfers and subsidies (Karabgovic et al., 2008).
This result is mostly driven by the effect of point resources that are immobile, and thus,
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more susceptible to government expropriation. The fourth chapter of this dissertation
examines the interaction of resource abundance with institutional quality to conclude that
the resource curse only exists in those states with poor institutions, while those states
with a considerable amount of natural resources and a high level of institutional quality
exhibit higher levels of economic growth. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the
previous chapters and offers some concluding remarks.

1.2 The Resource Curse: Evidence From U.S. State Constitutional Structures
This chapter of my dissertation analyzes the rise of governments in areas with greater
natural resource abundance. It focuses on the constitution of Wyoming who began
extracting minerals from the ground before forming its constitution and state government.
This constitutional analysis focuses on three main areas: taxation, regulation, and private
property rights. If the hypothesis that more expropriative governments form in order to
take advantage of an abundance of natural resources is true, then we would expect to see
statements within this constitution consistent with the taxation of these resources as well
as regulations focused on the resource sector and other related industries. Also, more
liberal eminent domain policies consistent with insecure private property rights are to be
expected.
Indeed, contained within Wyoming’s Constitution are statements specifically
concerned with the taxation of natural resources. Specifically, Wyoming adopted a
severance tax so that the government can gain additional revenue from the extraction of
natural resources. Also contained within this constitution are extensive regulations with
regards to the natural resource sector. This involves regulations on the mines as well as
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labor regulations involving the workers in these industries. Particularly notable are the
regulations involving the railroad industry, which is a critical component in the extraction
and transportation of natural resources. Lastly, this constitution has eminent domain
policies that allow the government to take the land of others, despite their objections.
Such policies reduce the incentive for innovation and the ability to profit from the use of
the land since it can be taken from you against your will.
This chapter continues its analysis on the rise of governments by looking to see if
state governments formed faster in areas with more natural resources. There is a great
deal of literature concerning the formation of governments that says that governments
will form more quickly in those areas where there is more wealth for the taking. This
would include those areas with a greater abundance of natural resources. In order to
accurately analyze this hypothesis, the study must incorporate those resources most likely
to be employed at the time of the formation of the state. A simple econometric model is
used to examine the effect of non-fuel minerals (including gold, silver, and iron) and coal
on the date of statehood when controlling for when the land was originally purchased and
whether or not the territory that would eventually become a state that bordered an ocean.
The results of the study were consistent with the hypothesis that states formed more
quickly in areas that contained a greater measure of non-fuel minerals and coal.
After having found evidence to support that more expropriative governments form
and that governments form more quickly in areas with more natural resources, the next
chapter of my dissertation looks at the effect of resource abundance on the size of
government.

5

1.3 The Impact of Resource Abundance on the Size of Government
This chapter focuses on how resource intensity affects the size of government and the
governments’ policies with regards to takings and transfers. Natural resources are likely
to lead to a larger government because there is an excess of wealth for the government to
expropriate. A large government (as measured by government spending and transfers
and subsidies as a share of Gross State Product) is problematic because it fosters an
environment conducive to rent-seeking where people will try to use the prevailing
institutions to take the wealth of others. This type of activity, named unproductive
entrepreneurship by Baumol (1990), crowds out productive entrepreneurship, which
consists of those innovative activities that create wealth and further enhance the
development of an economy. It is through this channel that an abundance of natural
resources can hurt economic growth.
In order to analyze the effect of natural resource abundance on the size of
government, this study looks at the effect of resource intensity, as measured by the share
of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining) in Gross State Product
(GSP), on the size of government as measured by the Economic Freedom of North
America (EFNA) area 1 score. This study is unique in that it is one of the first to
examine a determinant of economic freedom in an attempt to see why some states are
more free than others. The study includes controls that could also account for the size of
government. This includes constitutional variables as constitutions were designed to
constrain the government so that it continued to serve its citizens rather than overpower
them. The model also controls for the length of time in which the government has been
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in existence, as governments tend to grow over time and various political variables are
also included in this analysis.
Prior research has concluded that natural resource abundance leads to institutions
of lower quality and increased rent seeking. This study confirms those results as resource
intensity is negatively related to the EFNA area 1 score, indicating that more resource
abundant states have larger governments. This is particularly true for point resources
which must be mined out of the ground and are, therefore, immobile, as compare to
diffuse resources which can more easily move in classical Tiebout fashion (Tiebout,
1956) when confronted with an overly-intrusive government. Those states with an
economy more centered around mining point resources are more likely to suffer from
larger governments.
While chapters two and three have focused on the connection between resource
abundance and the formation and size of governments, the next chapter looks at how the
interaction between resource intensity and institutional quality affects development
across U.S. states.

1.4 The Resource Curse: Institutions, Economic Freedom, and Growth Across U.S.
States
The focus of this chapter is the answer to the question concerning whether or not natural
resource abundance is only negatively related to growth in states with poor institutions.
In their international study, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) found that some areas
with an abundance of natural resources were able to excel economically while others
exhibited the low or negative growth consistent with the resource curse literature. They
used an interaction term that combines various measures of intuitional quality and
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resource intensity to find that the resource curse only exists in those countries with poor
grabber-friendly institutions, while those countries with what they determined to be high
quality producer-friendly institutions exhibited higher growth in the presence of natural
resources.
The study in this chapter takes a similar approach by incorporating an interaction
term that combines resource intensity and institutional quality (as measured by the
Economic Freedom of North America composite score) into a growth model similar to
the one used by Papyrakis and Gerlaugh in the only other study of the effect of resource
intensity on growth across the United States. This model examines the effect of this
interaction term on economic growth (measured as the average growth in GSP per capita
from 1986-2005) across all 50 U.S. states using the same education, investment, research
and development, and openness variables that Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) used in
their study. This model also includes initial GSP per capita to control for convergence
and variables to measure population density, the climate, and whether or not the state has
any coastline as these have been concluded to be important variables in determining the
growth of an economy (Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs, 1998).
The study finds that the interaction term is positively related to development,
which supports the international result that only economies with poor institutions suffer
from the resource curse. Those states with better institutional quality will actually grow
faster in the presence of natural resources. The study goes further in finding that an
economic freedom score greater than 6.22 on a 10 point scale is necessary for the effect
of natural resources on growth to turn positive. This provides evidence for the finding
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that good institutions consistent with low taxation, a free labor market, and less
government involvement within the economy are necessary to lift the resource curse.

9

Chapter 2
The Resource Curse: Evidence from U.S. State Constitutional Structures

2.1 Introduction
The term ‘resource curse’ refers to the seemingly paradoxical, inverse relationship
between abundant natural resources and economic growth. This mysterious correlation
has garnered a great deal of attention from economists who have set out to uncover the
reason for this negative linkage. Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) were the first to
establish that the countries with a higher endowment of natural resources suffer from
slower economic growth. Their research was followed by many others who likewise
explored the resource curse and its potential causes on a global scale. 1
Only recently has the examination of the resource curse focused on the subnational level, where resources were measured as the share of the primary sector
(forestry, fishing, agriculture, and mining) in Gross State Product (GSP). The first to do
so was Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) who confirmed its existence across U.S. states.
This strikingly clear relationship, virtually identical to what is found in international
cross-country data, is shown in Figure 1.1.

1

See, for example, Leite and Weidmann (1999), Gylfason (2001), Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005),
Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005), and Stevens (2005).
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Figure 1.1: Resource Abundance and Growth Across U.S. States 2
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While this inverse relationship is extremely robust, the cause behind it remains
elusive. Sachs and Warner argue that resources will crowd out other important factors
that are conducive to economic growth. One such explanation is that the resource
intensive industry will utilize most or all of an economy’s scarce resources, which will
negatively impact other sectors of the economy by increasing the opportunity cost of
production. However, there is little empirical evidence to support this explanation
(Stevens, 2005).
Another possible explanation is “Dutch Disease”, which is a term coined after the
Netherlands discovered natural gas fields and, consequently, experienced a decline in

2

Figure is from Dunn (2008)
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their manufacturing sector. Dutch Disease occurs when a nation experiences a sudden
and extreme increase in wealth (in this case, caused by the discovery of natural resources)
which leads to an appreciation of the country’s real exchange rate, making its
manufactured products less competitive in world markets, further crowding out the
manufacturing sector. Some other authors, such as Gylfason (2001), partially attribute
the resource curse to the impact of resource industries on education levels and human
capital accumulation. Resource industries tend to be manual-labor intensive and, thus,
increase the (relative) opportunity cost of higher education and the development of
human capital.
More recently, authors have begun to explore ‘institutional’ connections to the
resource curse. A country’s formal institutions are those codified through law and
written documents such as a constitution, and ‘good institutions’ refer to those that are
conducive to wealth creation; such as an impartial administration of justice through the
legal system, secure property rights, and constitutionally constrained and limited
government. ‘Bad institutions’ refer to those that reward attempts to expropriate and
redistribute wealth, and infringe on the rights of citizens.
The ‘institutional’ explanation of the resource curse is that poor quality
institutions tend to evolve in resource abundant areas because they can focus on wealth
extraction from these immobile resources, and that these weak institutions are what is
then responsible for weaker economic performance.
Underground mineral resources are both fixed in location and highly valuable,
which make them prime targets for expropriation through taxation and regulation. Other
industries such as manufacturing can more easily escape bad governments by relocating
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to other jurisdictions in classic Tiebout (1956) fashion, and the intergovernmental
competition for their location (and subsequent tax revenues) leads to better institutions.
The inability of resources to escape expropriative governments leads to a less competitive
government policy structure and a set of institutions that are focused on rent extraction.
Poor institutions, coupled with powerful special-interest groups focused on expropriating
the value of the resources, draws entrepreneurial talent away from productive activities
and drives this talent toward plunder and other forms of unproductive entrepreneurship,
following the terminology of Baumol (1990).
According, then, to this line of logic, ‘bad’ institutions tend to evolve in resource
abundant areas, and these weak institutions are then what is responsible for worse
economic performance. The evidence of an institutional connection to the resource curse
is strong and growing. Leite and Weidmann (1999) provide evidence that natural
resources leads to increased corruption and rent-seeking. Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett,
and Busby (2005) find this to be especially true for point resources, which are those
resources that are tied to a narrow geographic area (such as gold, coal, and other
minerals) as opposed to diffuse resources which are more mobile (such as food and
agricultural products). Dunn (2008) finds that this result holds at the sub-national level
as she concludes that point resource abundance is positively correlated with measures of
rent-seeking across the U.S. states. Anecdotally, West Virginia’s heavy resource
dominated economy seems to be in line with this argument given its horrible economic
record and 50th place ranking in the Economic Freedom of North America institutional
quality ranking.
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In this paper, we provide the first direct evidence that those institutions which are
more expropriative, or of a lower quality, are indeed more likely to evolve in resource
abundant areas. We do so by examining both how rapidly state governments evolved
within newly acquired territories of the early United States, and by direct examination of
the constitutional structures of states. We focus our constitutional analysis on the most
likely state where this type of expropriative structure would evolve: Wyoming. While
many of the valuable natural resources currently produced in the states were discovered
after these areas were already states, Wyoming is the clearest case of a state evolving in
an area with known, valuable, resource production. Wyoming became a state in 1890,
more than 40 years after major deposits of coal and other mineral resources were
discovered. There was already a robust mining industry in the Wyoming Territory at the
time of the writing of Wyoming’s state constitution.
Today, Wyoming is by far the nation's leading producer of coal with over 450
million short tons (or 40 percent of the U.S. total) produced there annually. The second
ranking state in coal production, West Virginia, produces only about one third as much
coal. Wyoming’s annual coal production is larger than the total amount mined in the next
five largest coal producing states combined. The taxation of these resources accounts for
over one-third of Wyoming’s total tax revenue, ranking second only to state sales tax
revenue.
Far from the Rawlsian ideal notion of a “veil of ignorance” in constitutional
formation (Rawls, 1971), Wyoming is unique in that it had significant known stocks and
production levels of valuable natural resources before the constitution was written. That
is the state constitution (and the entire state governmental structure itself) was formed
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and adopted in the presence of resources to expropriate. Section 2.2 of this chapter
develops a simple model to show the implications of resource abundance on the
expropriative nature of government. Section 2.3 looks at the state constitution of
Wyoming in more detail. Section 2.4 examines our hypothesis that state governments are
likely to form more rapidly in those territories which were rich in known natural resource
wealth to expropriate. Section 2.5 concludes.

2.2 A Model of Expropriation
The fact that point resources lead to tax bases with a lower elasticity with respect to the
tax rate imposed on them implies that leviathan governments will both levy higher tax
rates and expropriate more revenue. This can be demonstrated mathematically.
Let Bi be a state i’s tax base, which is a negative function of the tax rate, ti,
imposed per Equation 1:
Bi = α – β * ti

(1)

The state’s revenue, Ri, is the tax base times the tax rate, following Equation 2:
Ri = Bi * ti

(2)

Combining yields:
Ri = (α – β * ti)* ti = α* ti – β * ti2

(3)

A leviathan, revenue-maximizing, government will set the tax rate that maximizes
revenue which can be found through differentiation:
∂ Ri /∂ ti = α – 2* β * ti = 0

(4)

Which implies a revenue-maximizing tax rate of:
ti = α / 2* β

(5)
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and filling back into the revenue equation (Equation 3) produces a corresponding
(maximized) level of revenue of:
Ri = α* (α / 2* β) – β * (α / 2* β)2 = α2 / 4* β

(6)

Within the scope of the resource curse argument, the difference between resource
abundant states and non-resource abundant states is in the responsiveness of the tax base
to the tax rate, or the parameter β. This parameter will be smaller to indicate the less
responsive tax base in resource abundant areas. Letting βR represent its value in resource
abundant states, βNR represent its value in non-resource abundant states, and imposing the
logic that βR < βNR makes it possible to conclude that leviathan governments in areas with
resources will impose higher tax rates, and expropriate more revenue. This is clear in
Equations 5 and 6, as with β in the denominator of both, lower values of β lead to higher
values for the tax rate and tax revenue, that is tR > tNR and RR > RNR. The next section
will provide a constitutional analysis of the formation of expropriative governments
around an abundance of natural resources.

2.3 State Constitutional Analysis: The Case of Wyoming
If indeed it is the ‘evolution of poor institutions’ explanation that is responsible for the
resource curse, rather than other competing hypothesis, we should be able to see evidence
in the constitutional structures of such areas. Here we use Wyoming as a case study3. As
mentioned earlier, Wyoming is unique in that known and valuable resources were clearly
present at the time this state government evolved. Coal was first discovered in Wyoming

3

For more information about the formation of Wyoming as a state please see Shearer (2004) and Larson
1999.
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in 1843, some forty years prior to statehood. The constitution of the State of Wyoming
was adopted on September 30, 1889 and ratified by the voters of Wyoming 6,272 (in
favor) to 1,903 (opposed) on November 5, 1889.
While Wyoming’s constitution has been amended many times since adoption,
unlike in most other states Wyoming’s original constitution remains in force and has not
been replaced by another constitution. In terms of length, Wyoming has the eleventh
longest state constitution. When looking through the state constitution of Wyoming one
can easily find words and phrases that look to be the seeds from which an expropriative
Leviathan government will grow.
Wyoming’s constitution includes significant language aimed at controlling and
regulating the activities of corporations. For example, section 97-10-002 of the Wyoming
constitution appropriately labeled “Control by State” reads as follows:
All powers and franchises of corporations are derived from the people and
are granted by their agent, the government, for the public good and general
welfare, and the right and duty of the state to control and regulate them for
these purposes is hereby declared. The power, rights and privileges of any
and all corporations may be forfeited by willful neglect or abuse thereof.
The police power of the state is supreme over all corporations as well as
individuals.
Another section, 97-10-006, even restricts corporations to one line of business:
No Corporation shall have the power to engage in more than one general
line or department of business, which line of business shall be distinctly
specified in its charter of incorporation.
This was amended in 1960 to loosen this requirement. Language such as this indicates a
government bent on excessive control over an economy and its resources.
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2.3.1: Taxation
While all state constitutions address the power of taxation, the vast majority mention it
only in a general context, and do not single out specific industries or products for special
taxation. Consistent with the hypothesis at hand, however, in addition to the general
statements normally found, Wyoming’s constitution also devotes substantial space
specifically to the taxation of natural resources. For example, section 97-15-003 reads:
All mines and mining claims from which gold, silver and other precious
metals, soda, saline, coal, mineral oil or other valuable deposit, is or may
be produced shall be taxed in addition to the surface improvements, and in
lieu of taxes on the lands, on the gross product thereof, as may be
prescribed by law; provided, that the product of all mines shall be taxed in
proportion to the value thereof.
In addition to specifically mentioning the taxation of coal being produced, Wyoming also
constitutionally specifies that the state will tax coal deposits that aren’t even in
production yet in section 97-15-002:
All coal lands in the state from which coal is not being mined shall be
listed for assessment, valued for taxation and assessed according to value.
The constitution does mention potentially limiting the tax on land, but this limit does not
apply if the revenue goes to support the states educational or charitable institutions,
alleviate the state debt, or payoff the interest on the state debt, providing an escape clause
from any binding limits on the property taxation of resources.
While the two passages above seem to give the state almost unlimited power to
tax coal and other resources, in addition to property taxes the state constitution also
outlines an additional severance tax on coal and the other fixed natural resources to be
mined in section 97-15-019:
The Legislature shall provide by law for an excise tax on the privilege of
severing or extracting minerals, of one and one-half percent (1 1/2%) on
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the value of the gross product extracted. The minerals subject to such
excise tax shall be coal, petroleum, natural gas, oil shale, and such other
minerals as may be designated by the Legislature. Such tax shall be in
addition to any other excise, severance or ad valorem tax.
Wyoming’s constitution also prescribes what the state will do with natural
resource properties that come into possession of the state through forfeiture and
inheritance taxes and acquisitions in section 97-7-002:
…the net proceeds of lands and other property and effects that may come
to the state by escheat or forfeiture, or from unclaimed dividends or
distributive shares of the estates of deceased persons; all moneys, stocks,
bonds, lands and other property now belonging to the common school
funds. Provided, that the rents for the ordinary use of said lands shall be
applied to the support of public schools and, when authorized by general
law, not to exceed thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3) per centum of oil,
gas, coal, or other mineral royalties arising from the lease of any said
school lands may be so applied.
From the above passages, we believe it is clear that the Wyoming state government
designed its constitutional structure around the intent to extract revenue from the
abundance of natural resources found within the territory’s borders. These provisions are
entirely absent from most other state constitutions, even in other coal-producing states
(neither West Virginia’s first or second constitution, for example, specifically mentions
the word “coal” nor outlines a specific tax on mineral resources). We believe this is
significant evidence in favor of the ‘bad institutions evolve in resource abundant areas’
hypothesis about the origins of the natural resource curse.

2.3.2: Regulation
In addition to taxation, a state government can also expropriate through regulation.
Those areas with a large amount of natural resources are likely to have governments
which will excessively regulate these resources, with an intent to transfer wealth to other
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organized interest groups. At the time of Wyoming’s constitution, perhaps the most
powerful interest group in the state was organized labor. Clause after clause of the
Wyoming constitution regulates and micromanages business contracts in the natural
resource industry with a clear intent to transfer wealth to the organized labor unions.
Section 97-01-022 refers to labor compensation more generally:
The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to
secure to the laborer proper rewards for his service and to promote the
industrial welfare of the state.
Perhaps most strikingly are the state constitutional provisions that mandate employment
contracts both in terms of hours worked and the content of the employment contracts.
For example, Wyoming’s state constitution regulates what determines a full day’s work
within the mines in section 97-19-002:
Eight (8) hours actual work shall constitute a lawful day's work in all
mines, and on all state and municipal works.
Interestingly, mines are treated in language similar to state and municipal employees, as
if mining was government employment. Also, interestingly, all other types of private
businesses (other than mines) are excluded from this constitutional provision.
Wyoming’s original constitution regulated who was allowed to work in the
mining industry. Specifically, women of any age were not allowed to be employed in the
mine. This is mentioned in section 97-9-003:
… no woman or girl of any age shall be employed or permitted to be in or
about any coal, iron, or other dangerous mines for the purpose of
employment therein…
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This regulation initially limited the mining companies hiring choices and reduced the
productive capacity of the mines. It was eventually repealed from the Wyoming
constitution, but not until November 7, 1978 4
The nature of the mining employment contract is also specifically regulated in
Wyoming’s constitution. Section 97-19-007 prohibits employment contracts from
containing provisions that exempt the employer from liability for workers’ personal
injuries.
It shall be unlawful for any person, company or corporation, to require of
its servants or employees as a condition of their employment, or
otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such person, company or
corporation shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility,
on account of personal injuries received by such servants or employees,
while in the service of such person, company or corporation, by reason of
the negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the agents or
employees thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null and void.
The above two provisions, normally found in statutory laws passed to appease labor
union interest groups in other states, are uniquely integrated into Wyoming’s actual
constitution, unlike in any other state.
Wyoming’s constitution also specifies provisions related to workplace injuries
and the compensation due employees in Section 97-9-004:
For any injury to person or property caused by willful failure to comply
with the provisions of this article, or laws passed in pursuance hereof, a
right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for the damage sustained
thereby, and in all cases in this state, whenever the death of a person shall
be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover
damages in respect thereof, the person who, or the corporation which
would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action
4

It is interesting to notes that Wyoming has often been referred to as the equality state because it was the
first state to grant women the right to vote. However, in their initial constitution, they enacted regulation
specifically designed to keep women out of working in the mines, and this regulation persisted until the late
1970’s.
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for damages notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and the
legislature shall provide by law at its first session for the manner in which
the right of action in respect thereto shall be enforced.
Mostly unlike in modern times, labor union strikes in the mining industry in the
late 1800s and early 1900s were fraught with violence. Striking workers often resorted to
violence against potential replacements, company managers, and company property.
With local law enforcement unions aligned strongly with the labor unions in most states,
these activities were often backed, rather than prosecuted, by law enforcement units.
Because of this, companies generally hired private security to help them during times of
labor union strikes, and these units moved from one state to another depending on where
they were most needed within the company. In a one-of-a-kind constitutional provision,
Wyoming actually prevents companies from hiring this type of private protection to
enforce their own rights to life and property. This is contained in Section 97-19-006:
No armed police force, or detective agency, or armed body, or unarmed
body of men, shall ever be brought into this state, for the suppression of
domestic violence, except upon the application of the legislature, or
executive, when the legislature cannot be convened.
The net effect of this prohibition is to greatly enhance the ability of the labor unions to
use violence to expropriate wealth from mining companies through labor contracts.
Wyoming’s state constitution also calls for the regulation of mining operations as
to be controlled and assessed by a mining inspector in section 97-9-001:
There shall be established and maintained the office of inspector of mines,
the duties of which shall be prescribed by law.
The constitution also calls for very specific regulation of the nature of mining operations
in section 97-9-002:
The legislature shall provide by law for the proper development,
ventilation, drainage and operation of all mines in this state.
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Finally, making sure not to overlook other areas of expropriation, the state constitution
goes on to explicitly mention that eminent domain shall never be interpreted so as to
prevent the taking of property of companies for public use in section 97-10-014:
Exercise of the power and right of eminent domain shall never be so
construed or abridged as to prevent the taking by the legislature of
property and franchises of incorporated companies and subjecting them to
public use the same as property of individuals.

2.3.3: Other Areas of Rent Extraction: Railroads and Water
In those states with an extensive abundance of natural resources, particularly in those
areas concerned with mining, the railroad industry flourished as a vital component in
transporting this valuable resource to market. These railroad lines, like natural resources,
can be the objects of rent extraction by the state government. True to form, the Wyoming
state government imposes a significant amount of regulation on the railroad industry
aimed at transferring wealth.
In the Wyoming constitution, railroads are required to build and operate a station
at any town within 4 miles of a railroad line. In fear that the railroad companies (in this
case Union Pacific) would find ways to escape this provision through altering where they
placed the lines, the constitution explicitly forbids railroads from locating lines away
from towns in an effort to avoid having to comply with this law in section 97-10-019:
No railroad company shall construct or operate a railroad within four (4)
miles of any existing town or city without providing a suitable depot or
stopping place at the nearest practicable point for the convenience of said
town or city, and stopping all trains doing local business at said stopping
place. No railroad company shall deviate from the most direct practicable
line in constructing a railroad for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of
this section.
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The constitution clearly forces rail and other service providers, who were generally only
serving the mines, to also provide these services to local townships, even if unprofitable.
Section 97-10-012 states:
Railroad and telegraph lines heretofore constructed or that may hereafter
be constructed in this state are hereby declared public highways and
common carriers, and as such must be made by law to extend the same
equality and impartiality to all who use them, excepting employees and
their families and ministers of the gospel, whether individuals or
corporations.
To ensure railroads are profitable enough to cross-subsidize the legally required
passenger services for small towns, the state government also created barriers to entry
that reduced competition in section 97-10-018:
No foreign railroad or telegraph line shall do any business within this state
without having an agent or agents within each county through which such
railroad or telegraph line shall be constructed upon whom process may be
served.
Railroads were also subject to specific reporting requirements to the state in section 9710-013:
Every railroad corporation or association operating a line of railroad
within this state shall annually make a report to the auditor of state of its
business within this state, in such form as the legislature may prescribe.
Complying with these regulations increases the cost of doing business and makes it more
difficult for businesses to thrive in such states. However, since the railroads have to
transport the resources, the railroad industry is as immobile as the resources and are,
therefore, as subject to the whims of an evolving intrusive and extractive state
government in Wyoming.
In addition to the railroad industry; the extraction, socialization, and control over
the valuable water supply is also a target in Wyoming’s state constitution. The
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constitution set up a complete system of water allocation, unique among states to that
time, and it established the principle of state ownership of the resource in section 97-1031:
Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy
of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state,
which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests
involved.
The state then sets up a board of control as well as a state engineer with which to control
the use of all water in the state.

2.3.4: Summarizing the Evidence from Wyoming’s Constitution
While the evidence is clear that a resource curse exists, that is, that areas with abundant
natural resources tend to have worse economic performance, the avenue through which
this occurs is hotly debated in the literature. Recently, arguments have been made that
the explanation is institutional. That is, because fixed natural resources are easy targets
for expropriation, the types of governments that evolve in areas with abundant resources
tend to be ‘worse’ governments in terms of being focused on wealth extraction and
transfer, rather than being properly constrained in a manner that promotes individual
liberty, freedom, and wealth creation. If this institutional hypothesis is true, the
prediction is clear: we should see evidence of this in the documents that created
governments in areas with known valuable resources. Wyoming is a unique case study as
the state was formed well after known coal and other mineral deposits were already
discovered and being mined. Our examination of the provisions of Wyoming’s original
state constitution clearly illustrates this exact scenario. Unlike other states in which
resources were discovered after statehood, Wyoming’s rather long constitution devotes
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substantial space and language to the taxation and regulation of natural resources. The
fact that other state constitutions do not contain this language is striking. We believe this
is strong evidence in favor of the institutional explanation for the existence of the
resource curse.

2.4 The Rise of Governments
As a final piece of evidence as to the validity of the institutional explanation of the
resource curse, we test a novel prediction we believe will hold if this explanation is
accurate. The institutional explanation, as normally stated, postulates only that bad
government institutions will evolve, however, we believe a natural extension would be
the idea that governments should be likely to form more rapidly in areas with these
resources to expropriate. That is, in a given geographic area, the areas likely to have
governments evolve first will be those areas with known fixed resources to expropriate.
Continuing with our use of evidence from the U.S. states, we now examine how
rapidly state governments were to evolve within territorial acquisitions of the early
United States. The land area of the United States was expanded through several major
territorial acquisitions. Each of these territories then, though time, was divided up into
many states that were controlled by different state governments. The question we ask is,
holding constant the date the land area became a U.S. territory, is it true that the first
areas carved out into states, with official state governments, were those with more
abundant resources to expropriate. We explore this using regression methodology by
estimating the following equation:
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Date of Statehood = α0 + β1* Date of Territorial Acquisition or Purchase + β2* Resource
Abundance + ε
We also include a control variable reflecting whether the land bordered an ocean (and
thus had potential for a seaport). After dropping Alaska, Hawaii, and West Virginia, we
are left with 47 states in our sample. 5
Ideally we would like to include a variable that measured the value of the known
resources at the time when each state was still a territory. Unfortunately, the data on
mining and resources by state does not exist that far back. As a proxy, which is clearly
less than ideal, we use a recent measure of resources, but attempt to make it more
reflective of only those resources likely to be known at the time of statehood. For
example, oil and natural gas were mostly discovered in the United States after these areas
became states and the importance of these resources had not yet been fully realized, and
therefore, the value of these should not be included. The resources at play in the early
days of settlement were mostly the non-fuel minerals such as gold, silver, and iron. So
our measure of resources consists of the value (in millions of dollars) of non-fuel
minerals for the year 2000. A list of all of the variables used in our empirical analysis
along with a description and source can be found in Appendix 2A. Appendix 2B contains
a complete list of all resources included in the non-fuel minerals variable.
In terms of the predicted signs on the coefficients, we would expect the
coefficient on territorial acquisition to be positive, showing that a later date of land
acquisition results in a later date of statehood, while, consistent with the institutional
5

We focus our analysis on the continental U.S. and exclude Alaska and Hawaii (the last two U.S. states,
who were long time territories). Also, West Virginia warranted special treatment. It was originally part of
Virginia until 1863. To be consistent we treat Virginia as it would have been at the time of statehood by
including the value of any resources from West Virginia in the data for Virginia, and dropping West
Virginia from the analysis.
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explanation for the resource curse, we would expect the coefficient on resource
abundance to be negative and significant, indicating that governments evolved sooner in
these areas.
Table 2.1: Formation of Governments and Resource Abundance
Dependent Variable:

Date of Statehood

(1)
-796.1447**
(2.21)

(2)
-592.3624**
(2.08)

(3)
-417.2117
(1.41)

Date of Territorial
Acquisition or Purchase

1.4653***
(7.26)

1.3609***
(8.57)

1.2644***
(7.67)

Abundance of Nonfuel
Minerals

-0.0114*
(1.77)

-0.0113**
(2.26)

-0.0091*
(1.81)

-35.3260***
(5.40)

-37.8178***
(5.77)

Constant

Coastal Border

Abundance of Coal

-5.31*
(1.75)

Observations
47
47
47
2
R
0.5696
0.7435
0.7608
F-statistic
29.12***
41.54***
33.40***
Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis.
The symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

Table 2.1 shows the results of our regressions. The results are consistent with our
hypothesis. Controlling for the date of territorial acquisition, our measure of resource
abundance in the state’s subsequent territory (non-fuel minerals) is negative and
significant. In our second specification we also include a dummy variable for whether
the state’s eventual area bordered an ocean. As mentioned earlier, the potential for ports
and easier transportation generally led to more rapid settlement so it might be important
to include this as a control variable. Interestingly, it is possible to argue that these seaport
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areas are similar fixed resources that might lead to faster government formation to
expropriate this value. However, we simply include it as a control as our focus is on
traditional natural (mineral) resources mentioned in the previous resource curse literature.
The inclusion of the coastal border variable strengthens our results and improves
our model. The dummy variable for coastal border is positive and significant as
expected, while the coefficient on our variable of interest remains relatively unchanged in
magnitude, although it increases in significance due to the reduced unexplained error
resulting from including the coastal border variable.
Our non-fuel measure of resources potentially excludes one resource that would
have been known in some states at the time of statehood—the value of coal. The
inclusion of current coal reserves or production is more problematic than the other
minerals as current coal reserves were only partially discovered that far back. Luckily,
coal production data goes back much further than the similar data for other natural
resources, so we can use a measure farther back in time to limit the problems with
undiscovered coal being included in the variable. Our third regression shown in Table 1
includes the number of long tons of coal produced by state in the year 1900.
The results show that both measures of resource abundance are negative and
significant. This again confirms our hypothesis that governments evolved more quickly
in states with a larger amount of wealth in the form of natural resources to expropriate.

2.5 Conclusion
While the existence of a resource curse is unquestioned, the path through which it
happens is hotly debated. Recently institutional explanations have begun to show
promise at the international level. This line of reasoning suggests that resource abundant
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areas have poor economic performance because they suffer from the presence of bad
political and legal institutions aimed at expropriating wealth from resource industries
which are fixed in location. We add to this literature by examining the evidence on state
government formation in the United States.
We hypothesize that state constitutional structures should reflect this
expropriative bent if this logic is true. By examining the unique case of Wyoming, a state
that was formed clearly after the presence of valuable resources were known, we find
clear evidence in favor of the institutional explanation for the resource curse. Wyoming’s
lengthy constitution contains pages of material explicitly aimed at taxing and regulating
natural resource industries.
We also examine an interesting hypothesis we propose, which is that if this
institutional explanation is true we would expect land areas with resources to witness the
formation of governments more rapidly. Using evidence from U.S. territorial
acquisitions, we indeed find that those areas likely to become states first within each
territory were precisely those with known fixed resources to expropriate.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that the ‘curse’ that exists with having
abundant natural resources is, indeed, a result of the expropriative institutions that
develop in resource abundant areas. After having established the connection between
resource intensity and the formation of expropriative governments, the next chapter
examines the connection between resource intensity and the growth of governments
beyond their productive capacity.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Resource Abundance on the Size of Government

3.1 Introduction
The idea that an abundance of natural resources is negatively correlated with economic
growth is now commonly known as the resource curse. There has been a great deal of
research conducted on this seemingly paradoxical economic phenomenon since the
seminal work of Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) first explained this link. There exists a
large number of theories of how natural resources can negatively impact growth. Sachs
and Warner (2001) summarized most of these explanations as the idea that an abundance
of natural resources crowds out certain activities and these activities are what drives
growth. However, because there is debate over what drives growth, there is debate about
how resources adversely affect various economies.
The United States provides a fertile ground for the examination of the resource
curse because there are similarities across states which eliminate differences that may be
problematic when trying to analyze this concept at the international level, but there are
also enough differences in resource endowments and other growth-related factors across
states to allow for such research. However, only recently have scholars attempted to
study this link at the state level (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006; Dunn, 2008). This paper
continues this regional analysis on the resource curse by providing the link between
natural resource abundance and government size, transfers, and subsidies, as measured by
the area 1 score of the Economic Freedom of North America Index.
The link between economic freedom and growth has been widely examined at
both the international and regional level and is well established in previous literature
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(Gwartney, Lawson, and Block, 1996; Gwartney and Lawson, 2002; Easton and Walker,
1997; Karabegovic et. all, 2008; Karabegovich et all, 2008; Dawson, 2003; Cole, 2003;
2005). So it is natural to study economic freedom as one of the growth causing variables
to be crowded out by natural resources. The next section of this chapter will explore the
idea of the resource curse and its potential causes. Section 3.3 examines the research on
economic freedom and growth to establish the link of economic freedom as a
transmission channel through which the resource curse operates. Section 3.4 provides a
discussion of the data including the advantages to studying the resource curse at the state
level across U.S. States, an explanation of the measure for resource abundance, and
theories behind the use of all control variables. Section 3.5 presents the empirical model
and its results. Section 3.6 offers robustness checks and the final section concludes.

3.2 Economic Freedom Leads to Higher Growth
The relationship between economic freedom and growth has been well established in the
previous literature at both the international and regional level. The Economic Freedom of
the World Index measures the degree of economic freedom across five major areas.
These areas are government size, legal structure and security of property rights, access to
sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners, and regulation of credit, labor, and
business (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003). Easton and Walker (1997) used this measure to
show that economic freedom is an important component of growth when examining the
market socialist state of China and other communist-era countries. The authors
concluded that an increased reliance on economic freedom would lead to greater
prosperity for China, while continued emphasis on market socialism would result in less
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growth. The authors compared Hong Kong (the country with the highest level of
economic freedom) in 1985 with other communist-era countries in which similar 1985
data was available. This includes the countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. They concluded that “were those countries to have had Hong Kong’s level of
economic freedom, per capita steady-state income would have been $6,350 higher on
average” (Easton and Walker, pg. 332).
The research by Cole (2003; 2005) shows the EFW index to be a large contributor
to growth across alternative empirical frameworks. Economic freedom was significantly
positively related to real GDP per capita in both a neoclassical growth model and in a
model including geographical variables (Cole 2003; 2005). This research established a
correlation between economic freedom and growth, but it did not establish causality.
Dawson (2002) provided evidence that the overall level of economic freedom granger
causes differences in economic growth at the international level.
The relationship between economic freedom and growth has also been established
at the regional level. The Economic Freedom of North America index establishes the
economic freedom levels of all 50 U.S. states as well as some Canadian Provinces by
examining government size, taxation, and labor market freedom across these areas. The
calculation of economic freedom across states is slightly different than at the national
level. Many of the categories that are used in the world index have too little variance to
be effectively used when calculating economic freedom across states. Factors such as
private ownership of banks, monetary policy, freedom to own foreign currency, and the
right to international exchange are fairly identical across states. Using the Economic
Freedom of North America Index, Karabegovic et. all (2003) conclude that economic
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freedom is a significant contributor to economic growth. Both the level and growth of
economic freedom have a significant impact on growth in per capita GDP.
The reason behind this consistent positive relationship between economic
freedom and growth can be explained with Baumol’s work on entrepreneurship (Baumol,
1990). Baumol used evidence from cross-cultural historical examples to show that there
are two types of entrepreneurship, productive and unproductive, and that productive
entrepreneurship fuels growth. Productive entrepreneurship consists of innovations that
enhance the quality of goods and services so as to make people better off. When a new
good or service is invented or an old good or service is improved upon, then people have
access to something that makes their life better, whether that be a new drug that cures
disease and improves health or a new technology that reduces cost and saves time. When
these improved goods and service are bought and sold then both the buyer and seller are
made better off and wealth is created. Indeed, the economic pie is being expanded.
Policies consistent with economic freedom provides fewer barriers to entry in the
development of these goods and services and fosters an environment that allows
entrepreneurs to profit from their discoveries which increases the incentive for further
development (Baumol, 1990).
Conversely, unproductive entrepreneurship involves developing new and
innovative techniques for taking the wealth of others through some coercive act or
manipulation of the legal system. The discovery of a new method of using the law or
prevailing institutions to redistribute wealth from one person to another does not increase
the size of the economic pie, but rather transfers the pieces from one person to another.
Policies that are inconsistent with economic freedom impose more barriers to innovation,
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discourages ingenuity, and encourages behavior consistent with rent-seeking, or the
transfer of wealth from others. An institution that encourages unproductive
entrepreneurship will crowd out the research and discovery that is necessary for the
growth and development of an economy. For this reason, economic freedom is a vital
component for growth. In the next section, this chapter discusses the various possible
explanations of how resource abundance influences growth and provides a connection
between resource endowment and unproductive entrepreneurship.

3.3 The Resource Curse
The idea that an abundance of natural resources would have a negative effect on
economic growth seems counterintuitive. However, this inverse relationship has been
demonstrated within an extensive number of studies. This link was first formally
identified in the seminal works of Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001). Their first study
(Sachs and Warner, 1995) found evidence for a basic negative relationship between a
high value of resource-based exports and economic growth, even after controlling for
initial income levels, international trade policies, bureaucracy, inequality, investment, and
terms of trade volatility. In a future study, Sachs and Warner (2001) found evidence to
further strengthen the idea of the resource curse. They concluded that the inverse
relationship between resource abundance and growth also holds when controlling for
previous growth rates, geography, and climate. Several recent studies have even
classified natural resource abundance as one of the ten most robust variables when
empirically studying international economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001).
Establishing the existence of the resource curse is only part of the analysis of this
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economic occurrence. There has also been an extensive amount of research done to
determine the cause of this relationship and the various channels through which the
resource curse operates.
A possible explanation for the resource curse is a concept known as Dutch
disease, which was named after the experience of the Netherlands in 1970 when the
discovery of natural gas fields significantly hurt the nation’s manufacturing sector
(Stevens, 2005). Dutch disease occurs when any factor (in this case resource abundance)
causes a sudden and extreme increase in a country’s wealth that leads to an appreciation
of the real exchange rate. This will cause the country to import more as foreign goods
are now cheaper in the face of the new exchange rate and export less as its goods are now
relatively more expensive to the rest of the world. This reduction in the exporting sector
will hurt the country’s efforts at industrialization, and thus, retard the county’s level of
long-run growth. There have been multiple studies that have investigated Dutch disease
as a possible cause of the resource curse. The results are conflicting, with only some in
favor of it as a possible explanation.
An argument has also been made for the idea that resource investment projects,
which are prevalent in resource abundant nations, will claim the use of the country’s
other scarce resources and, thus, prevent the economy from further development.
However, this explanation for the resource curse is only relevant in small countries with
large investment projects and most of the work on this explanation tends to be theoretical
in nature, as opposed to empirical (Stevens, 2005).
A great deal of research has evolved around the institutional explanation of the
resource curse on which this paper is focused. The main idea that persists throughout this
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literature is that resource abundance may lead the government to make policies that hurt
economic growth. It has been suggested that the development of natural resources will
increase the expectations of the general population who will, in turn, pressure the
government to quick and ill-advised decisions which increases government growth and
control (Stevens, 2005). The operation of the resource curse through the institutional
channel may also be the result of increased corruption, rent-seeking, and government
transfers that are spawned from resource abundance. This is especially true with point
resources, which are minerals that must be mined out of the ground and are, therefore,
relatively immobile, as institutions that develop around this type of resource can be more
extractive and controlling without fear of the resource moving away. Point resources are,
thus, a more likely channel to bad institutions than diffuse resources, which are more
mobile factors such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing that are more likely to leave when
confronted with an undesirable level of government. An abundance of natural resources
may also lead a nation’s government to make bad industrial policy, poor investment
decisions, and polices on subsidies and trade openness that could adversely affect growth
(Stevens, 2005).
Most of the research on the resource curse has been done at the international level
using cross-country data. So far, very little research has been done at the state level.
This is surprising given that the United States would seem to provide a fertile research
ground for looking at the relationship between institutions and the resource curse.
Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) provide the first regional study of the resource curse by
extending their international work on the indirect transmission channels of resource
abundance to the United States. The authors find that natural resource abundance is
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negatively correlated with growth across states because resource abundance decreases
investment, schooling, openness, and expenditure on research and development, while
increasing corruption.
The relationship between natural resource abundance and rent-seeking was also
analyzed at the regional level. Recent research provides both theoretical and empirical
support for the idea that resource abundance will lead to a higher level of rent seeking
through the use of the severance tax across the United States (Dunn, 2008). The author
finds that this holds for both point and diffuse resources. The idea that resource
abundance can hurt growth through an increase in rent-seeking is consistent with
Baumol’s theory of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990). It is likely that natural resource
abundance can negatively affect growth through increased rent-seeking, which would
replace productive entrepreneurship. The relationship between natural resources and
poor institutions that foster unproductive entrepreneurship has been studied at the
international level (Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby, 2005) but not yet at the
regional level. There are several connections between an abundance of particular types of
resources and institutional quality across countries.
One connection is contained within what the researchers call “rentier effects”.
This occurs when revenues can be extracted from a few easily controlled resources, such
as the owners of point resources who, due to the nature of their assets, are unable to leave
the jurisdiction of the state government. Access to these revenues gives the government
the ability to repress dissent from the population either directly through force or
indirectly through the provision of benefits, infrastructure projects, or transfers, all of
which can crowd out productive entrepreneurship (Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and
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Busby, 2005). Another connection between point resources and the institutional impact
on development is delayed modernization. Institutions that cater to the maintenance of
their point resource-owning revenue sources will resist industrialization because it will
spawn competitors who will threaten the power of the status quo. This attempt to squash
industrialization will likely reduce efforts at productive entrepreneurial activities, leaving
people to become less concerned with innovation and more likely to explore the
acquisition of wealth through rent-seeking. Combining these two connections, one can
see that resource abundance extinguishes the flames of productive ambition, while
strengthening the hold of government (Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby, 2005).
While this connection between resource abundance and institutional quality has
been examined internationally, it has yet to be looked at on a regional level making the
research on the indirect channels through which the resource curse operates in the United
States very informative, but not exhaustive. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006) are able to
demonstrate resource abundance’s affect on investment, schooling, openness, research
and development, and corruption, while Dunn (2008) concludes that resource abundance
will increase rent-seeking. This paper expands upon this previous research by analyzing
the effect of resource abundance on economic freedom, particularly with regard to
government size, transfers, and subsidies at the state level. This has important
implications as economic freedom has been repeatedly shown to be an important factor in
growth. The next section discusses the data used to examine this relationship.
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3.4 Data
This chapter adds to the relatively small amount of research of the resource curse at the
regional level. The use of state level data may be a more effective way to study the idea
of the resource curse as U.S. data have several advantages over international data. First,
U.S. data are more structured in that the same type of data that measures the same things
over the same period tends to be available for all states. International data is often
subject to measurement problems, inaccurate records, and missing observations. Indeed,
Sachs and Warner (1995) had to drop a number of countries from their study because of
measurement problems. 6 Using U.S. data will eliminate some of the unobservable
variability in the data set. Second, the use of U.S. data will eliminate the possibility that
it is the volatility of the exchange rate and terms of trade that lead to the resource curse.
This common explanation for the resource curse will not apply in this case as all states
are subject to the same currency. Finally, states in the U.S. tend to have the same
military history which is not true across countries. This eliminates the possibility that
growth is really being determined by some aspect of military history that is hard to
measure and incorporate into a model.
A similar argument can be made about the difference in culture between states as
compared to between countries (Papyrakis and Gerlaugh, 2006). While it could be
argued that different states have very different cultures, this cultural variance is not likely
to be as high as it is at the global level, so using U.S. data will reduce the chance of a
cultural variable, which is also difficult to measure, biasing the results. The elimination
of these confounding factors along with different state governments that have varying

6

Although, in this case the authors maintain that if they included those countries then it would have only
made their results stronger.
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levels of economic freedom make the United States a fertile ground for studying the
relationship between resource abundance and the government size, transfers, and
subsidies that foster unproductive entrepreneurship. Another important contribution of
this study is that it is the first to attempt to analyze the determinants of an area of
economic freedom at the state level. In other words, it is the first to try to answer the
important question of why some states are more economically free than others.
A measure of institutional quality that is frequently used in dealing with U.S. state
governments is the North American Economic Freedom Index which consists of three
important categories that are all calculated at the state or province level (Karabegovic et
al., 2003; Karabegovic et al., 2008). Area 1 consists of measures for the size of the
government in the economy. This includes the general consumption expenditures by
government as a percentage of GDP as well as transfers and subsidies as a percentage of
GDP. This represents how much the government has moved beyond the minimal
productive and protective functions necessary for efficiency. Subsidies and transfers
represent the removal of property without compensation which impedes on economic
freedom and provides a fertile environment for the growth and development of rentseeking behavior. For these reasons, area 1 is the focus of this paper.
The Economic Freedom of North America Index is calculated both with and
without the inclusion of federal government spending for U.S. states. Since this paper is
primarily concerned with the effect of resource abundance on the state government, the
study will employ the score that consists only of state government spending. This total
score is measured on a scale from 1-10 with 10 being the most free and 1 being the least
free. The independent variable of interest in this study is resource intensity which is
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measured as the total share of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining as a percentage of
Gross State Product (GSP). This is, admittedly, not a perfect measure of resource
intensity as it involves the reliance on resources rather than the amount of resources
within the state. Also, over the time period being studied, all states have experienced a
general decrease in resource intensity. However, share of the primary sector in GDP (or
GSP for states) is the most common measure for resource intensity in the literature
concerning the resource curse and it is the measure used by both Papyrakis and Gerlagh
(2006) and Dunn (2008) in the only other papers that examine the resource curse across
U.S. states. To analyze the effect of resource abundance on institutional size and
transfers that are consistent with unproductive entrepreneurship, this paper will focus on
the area 1 score of economic freedom. To be consistent with the literature on resource
intensity’s effect on institutional quality, resources should be negatively correlated with
this area 1 score of government size.
It is not expected that resource intensity for the year t will have a large effect on
the development of the institutional quality of the state government in year t. Rather it is
more expected that resource intensity at some time t will have an effect on the institutions
that develop over time as a result of this initial endowment and, indeed, this is how the
resource curse is typically studied. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006) use share of the
primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining) in GSP for 1986 to study
growth over the whole period from 1986-2000. This paper will also use a similar lagged
approach to the resource variable by using the five year average of the share of the
primary sector in GSP from 1986-1990 as the independent variable and economic
freedom for 2005 as the dependant variable. The five year average for the measure of
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resources reduces the potential for any effect to be influenced by an atypical amount of
resource intensity that could accompany any single year while still allowing for a time
period great enough for institutions to adapt policies to their initial level of resources.7
Since this is the first attempt to examine the determinants of an area of economic
freedom at the state level, a discussion of the control variables and the theory behind their
use is necessary. A complete description of every variable used and its source is located
in Appendix 3A. Historical, political, and constitutional variables are considered to
explain the differences in institutions across states connected by one overarching federal
government. These variables provide key institutional differences across states that are
otherwise very similar. The first control variable is the number of constitutions that the
state has adopted. Buchanan (1990) highlights constitutions as a mutually agreed upon
constraint on individuals behavior. An individual agrees to limit his or her behavior in
response to others limiting their own behavior and this is how government is originally
formed. These constitutions are designed to not only constrain individuals’ behavior, but
to constrain the government’s behavior as well. Thus, constitutions are paradoxical in
nature as they grant the government the right to exclusive use of coercive power, but also
try to limit that power. Public choice economists have recently studied constitutional
reform as a way of restraining the government (Cullis and Jones, 1998). In this way,
constitutions serve as a cage designed to keep the government from growing. Therefore,
the number of constitutions could serve as an attempt to measure the state’s efforts at
restraining the growth of government and have a positive effect on economic freedom.
However, constitutional reform could also result in political instability or be caused by

7

For robustness, I ran the regressions again using only the 1986 measure for resource intensity and it did
not significantly change the results. These results are presented later in this chapter.
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excessive institutional turmoil, which would result in a negative relationship between
constitutions and economic freedom. It is initially unclear which effect is stronger and so
the direction of the effect of this variable is initially unknown.
However, there has also been a great deal of study concerning constitutional
decline. This theory says that over the years constitutions have become weaker
constraints on government due to the rise in special interest groups and better political
tactics. Also, an increased preference for more government may lead to the adoption of
weaker constitutions in recent times (Cullis and Jones, 1998). The effective date of the
present constitution is, therefore, included to measure the effect of constitutional decline
on economic freedom. Measured as the year that the present constitution was adopted, it
should be negatively correlated with economic freedom as the leviathan-constraining
chains of newly adopted constitutions are likely to be weaker than that of older ones.
The average of the number of amendments that were adopted to the present
constitution over the time period being studied is also included in the analysis. Given the
rise of special interest groups, political tactics such as logrolling, and previously
mentioned constitutional decay, it seems reasonable to expect that newly adopted
constitutional amendments will likely weaken the constitutions constraints on
government size and economic interference. Therefore, it is likely that the average
number of adopted amendments will have a negative effect on economic freedom.
The natural tendency for the government to grow over time, a concept that has
come to be known as Wagner’s Law, cannot be ignored when trying to analyze the
determinants of government size (Cullis and Jones, 1998). There are numerous theories
concerning the reasons behind government’s growth, ranging from bureaucratic
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monopolies (Niskanen, 1968) to displacement effects (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961), but
it does appear that governments are greater in size and economic contamination the
longer that they are in existence. The date of statehood is then included into this study to
capture this effect. This is measured by the year in which the state and its government
were admitted into the union. To be consistent with the theories of government growth,
this variable would be positively correlated with economic freedom indicating that newer
state governments are not as intrusive as older ones. However, it is also likely that older
governments formed more quickly in areas with greater natural resources in an effort to
expropriate the wealth consistent with these areas. It is unclear which effect would be
stronger, and so the effect of this variable is unclear.
The final control variable included in this study is the average share of
republicans in the state house of representatives (calculated by dividing the number of
republicans in the house by the total number of members of the state house of
representatives and multiplied by 100 to formulate a percent using the data available from
various editions of the Book of the States) for the period 1986-2005. A discussion of the
senate and the governor as alternative political variables will be provided in section 6. It
is unclear how this variable would be related to this measure of government size,
subsidies and transfers, but it is necessary to include a political variable when analyzing
why state governments may be different. Equipped with an explanation behind the
theories and uses of these variables, the next section of this chapter will explain the
empirical model as well as the results.
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3.5 Empirical Model and Results
Past literature has shown resource abundance to be negatively correlated with quality of
institutions, therefore, it is expected that resource abundance would negatively impact
economic freedom. Table 3.1 below looks at the two states with the highest and lowest
scores in area 1 of the Economic Freedom of North America Index (Delaware and
Alaska, respectively) as measured in 2005, their level of resource intensity measured as
the share of the primary sector in GSP, and growth in GSP per capita from 1986-2005.
One can easily see that Delaware relies much less on natural resources than Alaska and
has a much higher level of economic freedom and growth in GSP per capita:
Table 3.1: Delaware vs. Alaska
State
Delaware
8.7
Economic Freedom (area 1)
0.814
Resource Intensity
5.74
Growth in GSP per Capita

Alaska
3.8
30.349
3.08

Much of the literature focuses on the idea that resource abundance will pressure the
government to get involved in the control and use of these resources (frequently doing so
by making quick and ill-advised decisions). The international literature focuses on
resource intensity’s tendency to cause the government to make growth retarding
decisions concerning industrial policies, investment, and subsidies. Thus, this literature
points to the use of the area 1 score of the Economic Freedom Index of North America
concerning government size and transfers and subsidies as the most likely to be affected
by differences in resource endowment 8. Therefore, the first regression uses a cross
section of 49 states to examine the following model 9:
8

The composite economic freedom score was used as the dependent variable and the effect of resource
intensity on the composite score is also negative, but insignificant. Resources most negatively affect
economic freedom through area 1 which includes government size and transfers.
9
Nebraska was dropped form the analysis due to the fact they have a bicameral legislation and, therefore,
no data available for the average share of Republicans in the state house of representatives
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EFNA Area 1 2005 = a0 + b1Resource Intensity 1986-1990 + b2Z + ∈

(1)

Where Z is the list of control variables mentioned in the previous section. Table 3.2
provides the results. As predicted, resource intensity is negatively correlated with the
area 1 score for economic freedom and the result is significant at the 5% level. The
results indicate that a 17.4% increase in the reliance on natural resources will lower this
component of economic freedom by 1 full point on the 10 point scale. This is
considerable since the most economically free state, Delaware, and the least
economically free state with regard to area 1, Alaska, are separated by less than 5 points.
The control variables have the predicted sign with the number of constitutions, the
number of adopted amendments, and share of republicans in the house of representatives
all significant at the 5%, 10%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each constitution a state has
increases area 1 freedom by 0.22 points, indicating that constitutions do serve as a way to
constrain government growth and intervention. Each amendment that gets adopted to the
present constitution has a smaller negative effect of reducing economic freedom by 0.002
points. The share of the republicans in the house of representatives is the most
statistically significant control variable, with a 1% increase leading to a 0.026 increase in
the area 1 score of economic freedom. The variables effective date of the present
constitution and the date of statehood are not significant, but the effective date of the
present constitution appears to be approaching significance at the 10% level. The model
itself is significant at the 5% level.
It is also noteworthy to examine the effects that different kinds of resources have
on government size. The literature on the relationship between institutions and resource
intensity states that the type of resource makes a significant difference in how institutions
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react and evolve to this resource wealth. Point resources, which consist of those that
must be mined from their current location, are relatively immobile and, therefore, more
likely to lead to extractive and controlling governments then diffuse resources which are
more mobile and can leave when institutional factors become too burdensome.
Therefore, it would be expected that point resources are a much more significant
contributor to government size and reduced economic freedom than diffuse resources.
This finding would be consistent with that of Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) who
find that point resources are more associated with bad institutions than diffuse resources.
In order to analyze this hypothesis, model 1 is adjusted to examine point and diffuse
resources separately, giving us models 2 and 3.
EFNA Area 1 2005 = a0 + b1Point Resources 1986-1990 + b2Z + ∈

(2)

EFNA Area 1 2005 = a0 + b1Diffuse Resources 1986-1990 + b2Z + ∈

(3)
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Table 3.2: Resource Intensity Average from 1986-1990

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity

EFNA Area 1 score
(1)
6.2848
(0.69)

(2)
6.7515
(0.90)

(3)
16.2705**
(2.22)

- 0.0575**
(2.63)

Point Resources

- 0.0556**
(2.66)

Diffuse Resources

.0293
(0.40)

# Constitutions

0.2195**
(2.27)

0.2087**
(2.20)

0.1251
(1.28)

Date of Present
Constitution

- 0.0055
(1.65)

- 0.005
(1.51)

- 0.0037
(1.03)

# of adopted
amendments

- 0.0023*
(1.93)

- 0.0022*
(- 1.86)

- 0.0016
(1.26)

0.0059
(1.28)

0.0046
(1.07)

- 0.0019
(0.46)

0.0265***
(2.85)

0.0237**
(2.59)

0.0207**
(1.98)

49
0.2848
2.79**
0.0226

49
.0.2871
2.82**
0.0214

49
0.1706
1.44
0.2225

Statehood

Share of Republicans
in House
observations
R2
F-statistic
Prob > F

Note: Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The
symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

The results confirm the expectations that point resources are more significantly related to
a lower level of this component of economic freedom then diffuse resources. The results
in regression 2 are nearly identical to those in regression 1 indicating that much of the
effect of resource intensity on economic freedom comes through point resources. The
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variable point resources is still negative and significant at the 5% level and the expected
signs of the control variables are still present and unchanged from the first model with the
number of constitutions and the share of republicans in the state house of representatives
significant at the 5% level and number of amendments adopted significant at the 10%
level. The model also remains significant at the 5% level.
The results for regression 3 are drastically different from that of regression 1 and
2. When analyzing the effect of diffuse resources on government size, the coefficient of
the resource variable changes and it is no longer significant. Also, all of the control
variables except for share of republicans in the house are insignificant and the model
itself loses its significance. The study then concludes that point resources are a more
powerful explanatory variable of changes in government size than diffuse resources, a
result at the regional level that is consistent with the findings of Bulte, Damania, and
Deacon (2005) at the international level. Indeed, the effect of total resources on freedom
comes almost entirely through point resources. This indicates that poor institutions are
more likely to evolve around immobile resources that are unable to move when they are
faced with an overly-intrusive government.

3.6. Robustness
For robustness, this study measures the effect of resource intensity in the year 1986 on
government size. This measure for resources is more consistent with that used in the
Papyrakis and Gerlagh paper (2006) than the five year average. In this new model,
whose results are illustrated in Table 3.3, the share of republicans in the house variable
drops in significance from the 1% level to the 5% level, but otherwise, the results, are
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little changed from that of the original model indicating that both measures for resource
intensity are valid for this study.
Table 3.3: Resource Intensity in 1986

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity
(1986)

EFNA Area 1 score
(1)
7.4662
(0.96)

(2)
8.397794
(1.12)

(3)
16.0009**
(2.19)

- 0.0531**
(2.21)

Point Resources (1986)

- 0.0535**
(2.27)

Diffuse Resources
(1986)

0.0165
(0.24)

# Constitutions

0.2130**
(2.14)

0.2080**
(2.12)

0.1275
(1.31)

Date of Present
Constitution

- 0.0055
(1.62)

- 0.0051
(1.51)

- 0.0038
(1.06)

# of adopted
admendments

- 0.0022*
(1.84)

- 0.0021*
(1.78)

- 0.0016
(1.27)

0.0048
(1.03)

0.0038
(0.87)

- 0.0017
(0.40)

0.0259**
(2.69)

0.0230**
(2.47)

0.0213**
(2.06)

49
0.2543

49
0.2587

49
0.1686

Statehood

Share of Republicans
in House
observations
R2

Note: Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The
symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

Table 3.4 includes the results when the share of republicans in the state senate as
opposed to the share of republicans in the state house of representatives is used in a
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model that is otherwise unchanged from the original. The two variables cannot be used
together in the same model due to the fact that they are highly correlated. The results are
largely unchanged, but curiously the share of republicans in the state senate is not
significant, while the share of republicans in the state house of representatives was
significant at the 1% level. The model also loses some of its explanatory power.
Table 3.4: Share of Republicans in Senate as Political Variable

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity

EFNA Area 1 score
(1)
5.6152
(0.68)

(2)
6.1903
(0.78)

(3)
16.5339**
(2.17)

- 0.0519**
(2.23)

Point Resources

- 0.0552**
(2.49)

Diffuse Resources

.0660
(0.91)

# Constitutions

0.1823*
(1.78)

0.1821*
(1.82)

0.0957
(0.95)

Date of Present
Constitution

- 0.0052
(1.47)

- 0.0049
(1.40)

- 0.0033
(-0.89)

# of adopted
amendments

- 0.0022*
(1.72)

- 0.0021*
(1.71)

- 0.0015
(1.16)

Statehood

0.0058
(1.18)

0.0051
(1.12)

- 0.0022
(0.50)

Share of Republicans
in Senate

0.0142
(1.43)

0.013
(1.34)

0.0104
(0.83)

observations
R2

49
0.1863

49
0.2067

49
0.1074

Note: Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The
symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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Due to the unicameral state legislation employed by Nebraska, it was eliminated
in all of the previous regressions. In an effort to include Nebraska in the study, the
political variable was changed to the average with which the governor belongs to the
republican political party over the years 1986-2005. This variable is given the value of 1
for each year the governor is republican and 0 otherwise. The average is then taken over
the years 1986-2005. This also does little to change the results, which are presented in
Table 3.5, except that again the new political variable is insignificant. Evidently, when
one wants to achieve a smaller government and a lower level of transfers and subsidies it
is better to bet on the house. The explanation for this interesting result is left for future
research.
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Table 3.5: Republican Governor as Political Variable

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity

EFNA Area 1 score
(1)
6.4829
(0.77)

(2)
6.2503
(0.78)

(3)
16.8983**
(2.22)

- 0.0457*
(1.94)

Point Resources

- 0.0537**
(2.40)

Diffuse Resources

0.0917
(1.35)

# Constitutions

0.1716
(1.63)

0.1757*
(1.72)

0.0934
(0.91)

Date of Present
Constitution

- 0.006
(1.60)

- 0.0055
(1.54)

- 0.0036
(0.95)

- 0.0026*
(1.90)

- 0.0025*
(1.93)

- 0.0018
(1.29)

Statehood

0.0063
(1.24)

0.006
(1.30)

- 0.002
(0.44)

Republican Governor

0.5675
(0.95)

0.4545
(0.77)

0.3382
(0.54)

observations
R2

50
0.1493

50
0.1846

50
0.1129

# of adopted
amendments

Note: Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The
symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

It is also appropriate to check the effect of natural resources on various measures
of government size in order to verify the robustness of the result. The area 1 score that
has been the focus of this analysis is broken into three sub-areas. Area 1a is the general
consumption expenditures by the government as a percentage of Gross State Product.
This is also calculated on a 1-10 scale with a higher score indicating more freedom
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through a lower level of consumption expenditures. Some may believe that this may be a
more accurate measure of government size than the entire Area 1 score. Therefore, this
variable is used as the dependent variable to study the effects of resources on government
size in a model otherwise identical to that given by equation 1. To be consistent with the
hypothesis, resource intensity should be negatively and significantly correlated with the
Area 1a score. This was also tested across both point and diffuse resources, and the
results are consistent with those of the original model. That is, the higher the level of the
state’s resource intensity, particularly with regard to point resources, the lower the level
of the Area 1a score indicating a larger and more intrusive government. Table 3.6
presents these results:
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Table 3.6: Area 1A – Government General Consumption Expenditures as a
Percentage of GDP

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity

Area 1A Score: Government General Consumption
Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP
(1)
(2)
(3)
9.3033
13.7107
24.8070**
(0.91)
(1.34)
(2.48)
-0.0952***
(-3.28)

Point Resources

-0.0794***
(2.77)

Diffuse Resources

-0.0847
(0.85)

# Constitutions

0.1514
(1.18)

0.1154
(0.89)

0.0139
(0.10)

Date of Present
Constitution

-0.0015
(0.33)

-0.0004
(0.08)

0.0004
(0.08)

-0.0016
(1.03)

-0.0013
(0.81)

-0.0006
(0.38)

-0.0012
(-0.19)

-0.0047
(0.81)

-0.0115**
(2.01)

Share of
Republicans
in House

0.0367***
(2.98)

0.0318**
(2.54)

0.0334**
(2.34)

observations
R2
F-statistic
Prob > F

49
0.3848
4.38***
0.0016

49
0.3465
3.71***
0.0047

49
0.2401
2.21*
0.0606

adopted
admendments

Statehood

Note: t- scores for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The symbols *,**,***

denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

Additionally, government size may be measured as the number of government employees
located within the state, so the number of state government employees and the number of
state and local government employees are used in order to examine the effect of resource
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intensity on government size. In order to be consistent with the previous findings,
resource intensity should be positively and significantly related to the number of state
government employees and the number of state and local government employees. The
results show that the greater the level of resource abundance, the greater the size of
government. Again, this is particularly true across point resources indicating that the
conclusion of the previous findings are, indeed, robust. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the
results concerning the relationship between resources and government size as measured
by state government employees as a share of the population and state and local
government employees as a share of the population, respectively:
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Table 3.7: State Government Employees

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity

Number of State Government Employees
(1)
-724.4247
(1.51)

(2)
-827.079*
(1.77)

(3)
-1181.148***
(2.68)

2.6472*
(1.95)

Point Resources

2.3325*
(1.78)

Diffuse Resources

1.0602
(0.24)

# Constitutions

-2.0961
(0.35)

-1.2720
(0.21)

1.9110
(0.33)

Date of Present
Constitution

0.0976
(0.47)

0.0696
(0.34)

0.0345
(0.16)

-0.0353
(0.48)

-0.0426
(0.58)

-0.0643
(0.85)

0.4113
(1.45)

0.4963*
(1.86)

0.7242***
(2.88)

Share of
Republicans
in House

-1.0415*
(1.81)

-0.9070
(1.58)

-0.8882
(1.42)

observations
R2
F-statistic
Prob > F

49
0.3451
3.69***
0.0049

49
0.3359
3.54***
0.0063

49
0.2868
2.82**
0.0215

adopted
admendments

Statehood

Note: t- scores for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The symbols

*,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 3.8: State and Local Government Employees

Dependant Variable:

Constant

Resource Intensity

Number of State and Local Government
Employees
(1)
1511.88***
(3.42)

(2)
1161.391**
(0.16)

(3)
-89.3263
(0.15)

9.2264***
(7.40)

Point Resources

8.1751***
(6.26)

Diffuse Resources

3.2204
(0.55)

# Constitutions

-1.0821
(0.20)

1.7253
(0.29)

12.9514
(1.66)

Date of Present
Constitution

-0.1204
(0.63)

-0.2172
(1.06)

-0.3443
(1.20)

0.3244
(0.48)

0.0073
(1.10)

-0.0693
(0.69)

-0.4265
(1.64)

-0.1351
(0.51)

0.6730*
(2.01)

Share of
Republicans
in House

0.0839
(0.16)

0.5512
(0.97)

0.6406
(0.77)

observations
R2
F-statistic
Prob > F

49
0.6278
11.81***
0.0000

49
0.5570
8.80***
0.000

49
0.1493
1.23
0.3113

adopted
admendments

Statehood

Note: t- scores for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis. The symbols

*,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter is the first study to examine the determinants of economic freedom,
particularly with regard to government size, across U.S. states. One of the variables
consistently found to be negatively correlated with institutional quality is resource
intensity, so this paper focuses on the effect of resource intensity on government size,
transfers, and subsidies at the state level. The paper concludes that greater resource
intensity does lower this component of economic freedom and, thus, lead to an
environment that facilitates unproductive entrepreneurship.
This effect is mostly through point resources which are immobile, and therefore,
provide a greater incentive for government expropriation and intervention than diffuse
resources which are capable of exiting in a classic Tiebout fashion when presented with
an undesirable level of government (Tiebout, 1956). This finding is consistent with the
literature on the resource curse at the international level and provides more evidence for
the importance of the institutional channel through which the resource curse operates.
After having established this connection between resource intensity and government size,
the next chapter examines how the interaction between institutional quality and resource
intensity affect the state’s economic development.
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Chapter 4
The Institutional Curse: Resources, Economic Freedom, and Growth across U.S.
States

4.1 Introduction
“There is no curse that can’t become a blessing and no blessing that can’t become a
curse” – adapted from “The Messiah’s Handbook: Reminders for the Advanced Soul” by Richard Bach
The inverse relationship between resource abundance and economic growth and
development is now commonly referred to as “the resource curse”. Sachs and Warner
(1995; 2001) first examined this correlation and there has since been an extensive amount
of scholarship surrounding this seemingly counter-intuitive relationship. An
understanding of the exact mechanism through which an abundance of natural resources
can negatively impact an economy’s development remains illusive. There are several
possible explanations concerning the channels through which the resource curse operates.
Most of these explanations were appropriately summarized by Sachs and Warner (2001)
as the idea that resource abundance will crowd out certain factors that are conducive to
growth, and because there is debate about which factors drive growth, there is debate
about the true operation of the resource curse.
Included among these numerous possible causes of the resource curse are various
institutional explanations. Most central to this paper is the analysis performed by
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) who found it interesting that some countries with a
considerable level of natural resources had very low levels of economic growth, while
others exhibited high levels of growth. They examined how the interaction between
resources and institutional quality affects growth at the international level and found that
those countries with both a high level of institutional quality and a high level of natural
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resources had high levels of growth, while those with low levels of institutional quality
and high levels of resource abundance exhibited lower levels of economic growth.
Only recently has the analysis of the resource curse been focused at the state
level. This is surprising given that United States data is very conducive to examining the
resource curse as all of the states have varying levels of natural resources, but are similar
in many ways that resolve issues which are problematic for the international analysis.
Some of these problems include inaccurate or inconsistent data, different cultures and
military backgrounds, and confounding effects through changes in the exchange rate.
Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) were the first to examine the relationship between
resource abundance and growth across U.S. states. They found evidence that significant
resource endowment negatively affects growth at the state level through the indirect
channels of investment, schooling, openness, corruption, and research and development.
Dunn (2008) later found that resource abundance can lead to higher levels of rent
seeking, which can crowd out productive activity and negatively impact growth. This
paper contributes to this limited literature by examining how the interaction between
resource abundance and institutional quality affects development across U.S. states.
The next section of this chapter examines the relationship between economic
freedom and growth both internationally and at the state level. Section 4.3 provides a
review of the various potential explanations for the traditionally negative relationship
between resource abundance and growth at the international level. Section 4.4 extends
this analysis to the state level by looking at the recent literature on the resource curse in
the United States. Section 4.5 provides a description of the data used to empirically
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examine the effect of resource abundance and economic freedom on growth across states.
Section 4.6 presents the empirical model and its results. The final section concludes.

4.2 Economic Freedom and Growth
The connection between institutional quality and growth has been well established at both
the international and state level. High quality institutions are those that provide secure
property rights, free trade, a sound legal environment, and a good monetary system
consistent with low inflation. Low quality institutions are those that excessively interfere
in the market by placing restrictions on free trade, costly regulations on the labor market,
and a lack of property rights which inhibits production and innovation. The Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) Index is a measure of institutional quality that is frequently
used in international studies (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002). It is a composite score that
judges institutional quality by measuring freedom over 5 different areas: government
size, legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to
exchange with foreigners, and regulation of credit labor and business. The Economic
Freedom of the World index has been used to show that economic freedom is an
important component in determining why some countries are growing at faster rates than
others. It is consistently found that those countries with more economic freedom exhibit
higher growth levels and a higher standard living.
Easton and Walker (1997) used the EFW index to show the importance of
economic freedom in examining China and other communist-era countries. They
concluded that if these communist-era countries were to engage in more economically
free policies then it is likely that they would see remarkable levels of growth resulting in
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a much higher standard of living (Easton and Walker, 1997). Powell (2003) provided
evidence that economic freedom was a critical component in Ireland’s impressive recent
growth record. In fact, he concluded that Ireland’s growth was highest when the country
adopted policies that lead to its highest economic freedom scores. Research by Cole
(2003; 2005) and Gwartney and Lawson (2002) demonstrate a general positive
relationship between economic freedom and growth across several different empirical
specifications, including a neo-classical growth model and a model including
geographical variables. While this research explained the direct correlation between freemarket policies and growth, it did not establish the causal direction between the two
variables. However, Dawson (2002) did examine this causal relationship and concluded
that the level of economic freedom granger-causes differences in growth among
countries.
In addition to establishing this connection at the international level, the
relationship between economic freedom and growth has also been well-established at the
state level using the Economic Freedom of North America Index. This calculation of
economic freedom is slightly different from the world index. Many of the categories that
are used in composing the world index do not have enough variance to effectively
calculate the differences in economic freedom across states. Many factors such as
monetary policy, freedom with regards to foreign currency, private ownership of banks
and the right to international exchange are not different across U.S. states. However,
state governments still do exhibit significant differences in economic freedom based on
the size of the government in the economy, takings and discriminatory taxation, and labor
market freedom.
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Karabegovic et al. (2003) and Karabegovich et al. (2008) use the Economic
Freedom of North America Index and find a positive relationship between economic
freedom and economic growth. Both the level of economic freedom and its growth are
directly and significantly related to higher levels of per capita GDP. Kreft and Sobel
(1995) provide empirical support that this connection between growth and economic
freedom at the state level is the result of the fact that an economically free environment is
more conducive to private sector entrepreneurship and it is this entrepreneurship that
drives growth. The researchers conclude that those states with more economic freedom
also have higher sole proprietor growth rates. Entrepreneurial activity is a key
component for growth and development as it results in increased innovation and wealth
creating activity. In the absence of this productive entrepreneurship, people are more
likely to engage in rent-seeking and other transfer-oriented activities that involve
grabbing a piece of the economic pie, rather than making it bigger (Baumol, 1990).
Empirical evidence supports Baumol’s idea of productive versus unproductive
entrepreneurship across the United States (Sobel, 2008). In this study it was shown that
institutional quality was positively related to measures of productive entrepreneurship
such as venture capital investment per capita, patents per capita, sole proprietor growth
rate, total establishment birth rate, and large firm establishment birth rate while being
negatively related to measures of unproductive entrepreneurship such as lobbying
organizations per capita and a poor score on measures of judicial quality (Sobel, 2008).
In addition to higher economic growth, the Economic Freedom of North America Index
has been used to show that states with higher levels of economic freedom have lower
levels of income inequality (Ashby and Sobel, 2008) and higher migration inflows
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(Ashby, 2007), which indicate that economic freedom is associated with positive
outcomes on people’s welfare.

4.3 Resource Abundance and Growth
It seems counterintuitive that economies which have been seemingly “blessed” with an
abundance of natural resources would perform worse than those economies that have no
such resources. However, the link between natural resource abundance and low levels of
growth and development has been extensively studied and supported at the international
level, and this link has also, more recently, been established at the state level. The
inverse relationship between resource abundance and economic growth was first
examined by Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) who found evidence to support this result at
the international level. They concluded that a high value of resource-based exports will
lead to lower levels of economic growth; even after controlling for potentially
confounding variables such as international trade policies, income inequality, initial
income levels, investment, bureaucracy, and terms of trade volatility (Sachs and Warner,
1995). They later found that this relationship holds even when controlling for geography,
growth rates, and climates. Resource abundance has even been labeled one of the ten
most robust variables when doing an empirical analysis on international economic growth
(Sachs and Warner, 2001). Interest in the resource curse exists well beyond just proving
its existence. Many studies on this economic anomaly have been centered on how
resources affect growth by examining the various channels through which the resource
curse operates.
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One common argument on how resource abundance negatively impacts growth is
the idea that resource investment projects become prevalent in those countries that have
an extensive amount of natural resources (Stevens, 2005). These resource investment
projects act as a vacuum and suck up the country’s other scarce resources, which can
prevent further development within the economy. This potential explanation is
handicapped by the fact that it is only relevant in small countries with large investment
projects. Another drawback to this explanation is that there is little empirical evidence to
support its theoretical predictions (Stevens, 2005).
Another possible explanation for the resource curse is the concept of Dutch
disease. This occurs when anything causes a sudden and extreme increase in a nation’s
wealth which will, in turn, cause the real exchange rate to appreciate (Stevens, 2005).
The name Dutch disease was coined after the Netherlands experienced a decline in the
manufacturing sector as a result of the discovery of natural gas fields. When an economy
experiences an appreciation in the real exchange rate it will import more and export less
because its goods and services are more expensive relative to the rest of the world. This
decline in exports means that there is less production in the home country which can hurt
the nation’s industrialization efforts, resulting in lower levels of long-run growth. Dutch
disease has been widely examined as a potential cause of the resource curse with
conflicting results. Only some of these studies support Dutch disease as the primary
mechanism through which the resource curse operates, indicating that it is worthwhile to
examine other potential transmission channels (Stevens, 2005).
There has also been a considerable amount of research on the relationship
between natural resource abundance and the institutions that develop within an economy.
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The main thread through this institutional explanation of the resource curse is that an
abundance of natural resources may cause the government to adopt policies that deter
economic growth. There are many ways that resource abundance can lead to institutional
decline. One such method is that resource abundance will cause the population to have
greater expectations that will, in turn, put pressure on the government, resulting in hasty
policies that negatively impact the economy (Stevens, 2005). Natural resource
abundance may also cause the government to channel investment away from other
profitable sectors, engage in poor industrial policy, and establish subsidies and transfers
while restricting trade (Stevens, 2005).
Resource abundance has also been shown to be related to corruption and rent
seeking, which are more prevalent in economies with poor institutional quality, and it is
through these channels that resources negatively affect growth. Leite and Weidmann
(1999) provide both theoretical and empirical evidence to support that natural resources
will affect an economy’s growth through the indirect channels of corruption and rentseeking. This was especially true in less developed countries, whose institutions may be
weaker and less adaptable.
Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005) further examine the relationship
between rent-seeking and natural resource abundance by distinguishing between two
types of resources. They define point resources as those that can only be taken from a
narrow geographic or economic area (these include resources like fuels and minerals).
Diffuse resources are comprised of food and agricultural products. They conclude that
while rent-seeking is related to resource abundance, it is much more likely to occur when
a nation is primarily exporting point resources as opposed to diffuse resources. Bulte,
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Damania, and Deacon (2005) conclude that point resources are more likely to lead to
poor economic indicators through the indirect channel of institutions. Point resources are
more susceptible to corruption, rent-seeking and are more likely to be affected by poor
institutional quality because they are immobile and, therefore, cannot leave in response to
the negative impact of such factors. Alternatively, diffuse resources can be more easily
moved to other jurisdictions in response to bad institutions and this mobility can serve as
a way to constrain government and enforce better public policy (Tiebout, 1956).
Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2004) also examined the relationship between natural
resources and growth through the indirect channel of corruption in addition to other
indirect channels such as investment, openness, education, and terms of trade. They
analyze a sample of 39 countries to conclude that natural resource abundance negatively
impacts an economy through these indirect channels. Particularly, an abundance of
natural resources will lead to higher levels of corruption, lower investment, deteriorating
terms of trade, more protectionist measures, and lower levels of education (Papyrakis and
Gerlaugh, 2004). This is consistent with the idea that natural resource abundance leads to
increased income that will cause a nation to become slothful and less vigilant when it
comes to economic policies and institutional quality (Sachs and Warner, 1995).
Economies will rest on their resource abundance and neglect to invest, innovate, and
otherwise work toward long-run growth. Further, an abundance of natural resources
reduces the returns to investment and education as an economy can immediately succeed
by living off of their natural resources in the short run (Gylfason, 2001). This reduction
in investment and education will have adverse effects on the economy’s ability to
succeed in the long-run.
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The research that examines the connection between resource abundance and
institutional quality has largely been aimed at providing evidence to support the idea that
resource abundance leads to poor institutional quality and this is how resources
negatively impact growth. Easterly and Levine (2003) provided an international analysis
that crop production and geography in general only affects development through its
impact on institutional quality and that there is no evidence that tropical climates, germs,
and crops affect countries development directly other than through its impact on
institutional quality (Easterly and Levine, 2003).
In an international analysis, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) provide both
theoretical and empirical evidence that the resource curse only exists in countries with
poor institutional quality. 10 They note that not all resource abundant countries have low
levels of economic growth, and in some cases, resource abundance can be a blessing,
rather than a curse. For example, Botswana is very rich in natural resources (particularly
diamonds, a point resource) and, yet, still exhibits significant growth. Upon further
investigation, the researchers find that among African countries, Botswana has the best
score on the Grongingen Corruption Perception Index used for measuring institutional
quality (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006). Similarly, Norway has a considerable
amount of both point (oil and natural gas) and diffuse (timber, fish) resources and is
considered one of the least corrupt countries in the world. As a result, Norway’s growth
has been phenomenal, going from one of the poorest countries in Europe in the 1900’s to
currently one of the richest. The experiences of these nations were very different from
that of Nigeria, Mexico, and Venezuela who suffered from low economic growth after

10

For a description of the theoretical model, please see their paper “Institutions and the Resource Curse” by
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006)
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the discovery of oil within the respective nations. This is largely due to the fact that these
countries have poor institutions that consist of expropriative governments (Lane and
Tornell 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999).
In their paper, the researchers classify institutions as either grabber-friendly or
producer-friendly as measured by an institutional quality index that consists of the nonweighted average of five indexes, which include: a rule of law index, a corruption of
government index, a risk of expropriation index, a government repudiation of contracts
index, and a bureaucratic quality index (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006). They use
the typical measure of resource abundance, which is the share of primary exports in GDP,
and their measure for institutional quality to create an interaction term in order to look at
the combined effect of resources and institutions on economic development. They found
this interaction term to be positive and significant; indicating that the resource curse only
exists in those countries with poor “grabber-friendly” institutions. In those countries with
good institutions, resource abundance can enhance growth. When looked at this way, the
nations that supposedly suffer from a resource curse may actually be suffering from an
institutional curse. The next section will discuss the analysis of the resource curse at the
state level.

4.4 The Resource Curse in the United States
Most of the research performed on the connection between resource abundance and
growth is performed using international data and only recently has any work been
performed at the state level. This is somewhat surprising given that the United States is
an ideal setting for analyzing the relationship between resources and growth. U.S. data
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has several advantages over international data when examining the resource curse.
Different states, like different countries, have various levels of natural resources as well
as different growth patterns and different levels of institutional quality (with regard to
state governments). However, unlike different countries, all U.S. states use the same
currency so it is unlikely that the exportation of resources from any one state is going to
lead to volatility in the exchange rate and a reduction in terms of trade that lead to the
resource curse. This is significant, as Sachs and Warner (2001) refuted the idea that an
abundance of natural resources caused poor institutional quality and thought that Dutch
disease was the more accurate explanation. They note that, while this economic
phenomenon is not easily explained, there is evidence that resource abundant countries
tend to be high priced economies that will be unable to take advantage of export-oriented
growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001). When conducting a cross-state analysis, the
likelihood that this is the correct explanation for the resource curse is severely reduced.
Another advantage that U.S. data has over international data is that U.S. states are
less likely to differ with regards to culture and military history then different countries.
For the most part, U.S. states have had more similar experiences with their involvement
in wars than different countries so it is unlikely that differences in growth across states is
determined by some aspect of military history, which would be difficult to formally
measure and use in an econometric model. This argument can also be extended to the
various cultures found within each state. While it is true that there are very real cultural
differences between West Virginia and California for example, or Texas and most other
states, these differences are likely not as significant as the differences between Nigeria
and Norway. Again, these cultural variables are difficult to measure and incorporate into
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a model so using U.S. data is a good way to reduce them and keep them from biasing the
results. Finally, U.S. data are more consistent in that the variables tend to be measured in
the same way over the same time period and are available for all states whereas
international data is more subject to inaccurate or missing records and measurement
problems.
Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) provide the first regional study of the resource
curse by extending their international work on the indirect transmission channels of
resource abundance to the United States. The authors find that natural resource
abundance is negatively correlated with growth across states because resource abundance
decreases investment, schooling, openness, and expenditure on research and
development, while increasing corruption. The idea that natural resources crowd out
investment and the development of human capital, while being negatively related to
institutional quality, holds at the regional level as well. Recent research has also
provided both theoretical and empirical support for the idea that resource abundance will
lead to a higher level of rent seeking through the use of the severance tax across the
United States (Dunn, 2008). The author finds that this holds for both point and diffuse
resources. The idea that resource abundance can hurt growth through increased rentseeking that crowds out productive activity is consistent with Baumol’s theory of
productive versus unproductive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990).
This chapter extends the limited research of the resource curse across U.S. states
by analyzing the effect of institutional quality on the relationship between resource
abundance and growth. In particular, this chapter attempts to show that the result found
by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) in which the resource curse only exists in those
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countries with grabber-friendly institutions extends to U.S. states by adapting their
interaction term to the growth model presented in Papyrakis and Gerlaugh’s (2006)
original regional analysis of the connection between resource abundance and growth.
The next section will examine the data used to empirically test the connection between
resources, institutions, and growth.

4.5 Data
This paper will use an interaction term similar to that created by Mehlum, Moene, and
Torvik (2006) in order to analyze the connection between resources, institutions and
growth across U.S. states. The Economic Freedom of North America Index (EFNA) will
serve as the measure of institutional quality. As noted earlier, the EFNA has been used as
a way to measure institutional differences across states in many other studies and has
been shown to be related to growth and welfare factors across states. This index is
comprised of three categories, all of which are calculated at the state or province level
(Karabegovic et. all, 2003; Karabegovic et. all, 2008). The first area includes measures
for the size of the government in the economy as well as subsidies and transfers.
Contained within the calculation of this score are the general consumption expenditures
by the government as a percentage of Gross State Product (GSP). This represents how
involved the state government is within the economy. A heavy state involvement beyond
the minimal productive and protective functions of the government could result in less
growth through a crowding out of the private sector. Subsidies and transfers involve the
removal or dissolution of property in an effort to redistribute rather than create wealth.
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This type of activity is similar to that of what Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) labeled
grabber-friendly institutions.
Area 2 includes takings and discriminatory taxation. This consists of total
government revenue as a percentage of GSP, the top marginal tax rate and the income
threshold with which it applies, indirect taxes as a percentage of GSP, and sales taxes
collected as a percentage of GSP. A higher tax burden leads to increased deadweight loss
and reduced economic efficiency as well as restricting private choice. This is especially
true when these taxes have a discriminatory impact and are not paid in proportion to the
benefits received from the use of the tax. Thus, a higher tax rate reduces freedom and is
represented by a lower score in this area of calculation for the EFNA (Karabegovic et. all,
2003; Karabegovic et. all, 2008).
Area 3 represents labor market freedom. This includes minimum wage
legislation, government employment as a percentage of total state employment, and
occupational licensing. A high minimum wage limits the ability of employers and
employees to formulate contracts. This component is measured as the annual income of
minimum wage workers divided by per capita GSP (per capita GSP is used as a proxy for
productivity). The higher minimum wage as a percentage of productivity is, the more it
restricts the ability of workers and firms to reach agreements concerning employment
and, thus, reduces freedom. A high percentage of government employment will also
reduce economic freedom as it indicates that the government is producing goods and
services beyond the minimal levels necessary for efficiency. Finally, a higher number of
regulated occupations will reduce the mobility of labor as well as restrict entry into the
market and will, therefore reduce economic freedom and be characterized by a lower
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score in this component of the index (Karabegovic et. all, 2003; Karabegovic et. all,
2008).
These three areas are measured on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 representing being
the most free and 1 being the least free. The three areas are then equally weighted and
averaged together in order to get the total freedom score for the state, also measured on a
scale from 1 to 10. Those states with a higher EFNA score represent those institutions
which are producer-friendly as labeled by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006), while
those with a lower economic freedom score represent low quality or grabber-friendly
institutions. The North American Economic Freedom Index is calculated both with the
inclusion of federal government spending for U.S. states and without it. The primary
focus of this paper is the effect of the relationship between the state institutions and
resource abundance on development, so the analysis will focus only on the measure that
excludes the involvement of the federal government. While research at the international
level, such as that conducted by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006), combines various
indexes to form a measure of institutional quality, the Economic Freedom of North
America Index by itself provides an adequate measure of institutional quality across U.S.
states. This is because U.S. state institutions still operate under an over-arching federal
government that applies the same macroeconomic policies and rule of law across all
states. Therefore, there is little variation in these areas across states and no need for
additional measures of institutional quality.
The measure of Resource Intensity used in this study is comprised of the total
share of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining as a percentage of the economy (or in
this case, GSP). This measure of resource intensity is more concerned with the reliance
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on natural resources within the economy rather than the actual amount of resources
within the state and, is therefore, an imperfect measure of resource abundance. Also, all
states have experienced a general decrease in resource intensity over the time period
examined within this study. Nonetheless, it is the most common measure for resource
intensity in both the international and regional literature that analyzes the resource curse
and it is the measure used by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) of which this analysis
is based, and by Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) and Dunn (2008) in their papers that
examine the resource curse across the United States.
This study will use a growth model adapted from the one used by Papyrakis and
Gerlaugh (2006) in the first regional analysis of the resource curse. Their study analyzes
the effect of resource intensity as measured in 1986 on the effect of growth from 1986 to
2000. It is common to include this lag when measuring the effect of resource intensity on
growth because resources in one year are not expected to affect the development of the
economy in that same year, rather it is expected to influence the development of the
economy in subsequent years. This study takes the same measure of resource intensity
and multiplies it by the EFNA score (without the inclusion of federal spending) for 1986
to develop an interaction term similar to the one used by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik
(2006). This interaction term is used to study the effect of resource intensity, operating
through institutional channels, on an economy’s development over the years 19862005 11. The dependent variable, Growth, is the average annual growth rate in real percapita GSP between 1986 and 2005 measured as (ln(Y2005/Y1986)/19) x 100%.

11

A list of the variables used and their description is located in appendix 4A. The names of the variables
appear in italics throughout the text.
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As control variables, this paper follows the model used by Papyrakis and
Gerlaugh (2006) with some additional controls that have been shown to be related to
growth. In their analysis, Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006) control for conditional
convergence by including Initial Income which is measure as the log of GSP per capita in
1986. The same control is incorporated in this study.

They also include a measure for

Investment that involves the share of industrial machinery production in GSP for the year
1986. Empirical evidence shows that machinery production is more strongly associated
with productivity growth then other investment components when measured across
nations (De Long and Summers, 1991). They also included an educational variable
known as Schooling that consists of the contributions of educational services as a share of
GSP in 1986. This variable is supposed to serve as a proxy for investments in human
knowledge which is expected to contribute positively to economic growth.
They next include a variable for Openness which is measured differently when
comparing the openness of one U.S. state to the next as compared to looking at this
difference across countries. They define openness as the ratio of net international
migration for the 1990-1999 period relative to the population of the state in 1990 for each
state. A more open economy will receive more foreigners compared to a relatively
closed economy and it is likely that these in-coming people will carry a certain amount of
human capital with them, so it is expected that being a more open economy will
contribute positively to economic growth. They also included a measure for research and
development (R&D), defined as the share of research and development in GSP for 1987,
which serves as a measure for innovative ability within the respective economies. It is
expected that those states who contribute more to R&D and thus enhance their innovative
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ability will also expect to see higher growth rates (Papyrakis and Gerlaugh, 2006). In
order to stay consistent with this initial analysis of the resource curse across U.S. states,
this study also incorporates these same variables of Initial Income, Investment, Schooling,
Openness, and R&D as controls into the model.
There is research to suggest that some other controls should be included in this
growth model. Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs (1998) looked at the connection between
geography and international economic development, and noted some stylized effects
regarding certain geographic variables and growth. Globally, they found that land-locked
countries tend to be more poor than coastal economies and that there is a weakly positive
relationship between population density and income. They have also noted that nearly all
countries with tropical climates are poor and that income grows as one goes from tropical
climates to countries with more temperate weather. Their empirical findings suggest that
coastal countries and those with a more temperate climate do perform better than landlocked countries and economies with more tropical climates. Also, population density is
positively related to growth, but only in coastal areas.
There are several explanations for why these different geographic variables matter
in development. Landlocked countries tend to do worse in terms of development than
other countries because of their lack of access to waterways which can reduce transaction
costs in developing an economy’s infrastructure and make migration easier. For this
reason, this study includes a dummy variable (Coastal) equal to 1 if the state has any
coast line at all or equal to zero if the state is landlocked. It would be expected that
having a coast would have a positive impact on growth High population densities may
be favorable for development because of increasing returns to scale in infrastructure
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networks and increased specialization and division of labor. In order to incorporate this
into the model, a variable Pop_Density, which is measured as population divided by
square mile for each state in 1986, is included. This variable is also expected to have a
positive impact on development. Tropical climates may have had trouble developing
because the weather yields a higher prevalence of certain diseases and lower agricultural
output. In order to measure the effect of tropical climates on growth the average number
of annual heating degree days from 1971 to 2000 is included into the model as a measure
for Climate. The higher the number of heating days the more temperate the climate and
so it is expected to be positively correlated with growth. Equipped with this discussion of
the data, the next section will look at the empirical model and the results it yields.

4.6 Empirical Model and Results
The purpose of this study is to examine the affect of the relationship between resource
intensity and institutional quality on economic growth. In particular, it aims to see if the
international result that only countries with poor institutions suffer from the resource
curse examined by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) can be found within the United
States. Using the North American Economic Freedom Index sub-national composite
score as our measure of institutional quality and the standard measure for resource
intensity that is consistently used throughout the literature, we can create an interaction
term by multiplying these two variables together and, thus, analyze the following model:
Growth = a0 + b1 EFNA + b2 Resource_Intensity + b3Interaction + b4Z

(1)

Where Z is the list of control variables mentioned in the previous section. Table 4.1
provides the results where regression 1 utilizes equation 1 presented above.
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Table 4.1: Resource Intensity
Dependant Variable:

Constant

EFNA

The average annual growth rate in gsp per
capita from 1986-2005
(1)
(2)
(3)
16.8528***
11.2775**
18.9003***
(4.95)
(1.82)
(5.06)
0.1213*
(1.74)

0.1084
(1.30)

0.1137
(1.27)

Resource Intensity

-0.1150**
(2.14)

-0.1568*
(1.78)

-0.1573**
(2.26)

Interaction

0.0185**
(2.49)

0.0229*
(1.95)

0.0229**
(2.44)

-1.4384***
(4.00)

-0.8186
(1.20)

-1.6228***
(4.09)

Investment

-0.0007
(0.02)

-0.0509
(0.95)

-.0009
(0.03)

Schooling

0.0429
(0.39)

-0.0848
(0.47)

-0.0035
(-0.03)

Openness

7.6747**
(2.50)

0.4993
(0.08)

8.4316**
(2.38)

R&D

-0.0316
(1.02)

Coastal

-0.0460
(0.45)

-0.0271
(0.25)

-0.0216
(0.20)

Pop Density

0.0004**
(2.19)

0.0004*
(1.76)

0.0004**
(2.17)

Climate

0.0001***
(4.10)

0.0001***
(3.36)

0.0001***
(4.17)

Initial Income

-0.0373
(1.05)

observations
49
50
49
R2
0.6127
0.3751
0.5740
F-statistic
4.98***
4.60***
4.14***
Prob > F
0.0001
0.0002
0.0005
Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis.
The symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
joint tests are significant. The Huber / White Sandwich estimator of variance was used
in every regression to report robust standard errors.
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The results show that economic freedom has a positive and significant effect on growth
which is consistent with the past literature on the connection between freedom and
growth. Resource intensity is negatively correlated with growth which is consistent with
the resource curse hypothesis and the findings by Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006).
However, the interaction term is both positive and significant which is consistent with the
results at the international level found by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) regarding
the effect of the relationship between resource abundance and institutions on growth.
This indicates that the resource curse only exists in states with poor institutions as
measured by low scores on the Economic Freedom of North America Index. For those
states with higher levels of economic freedom, resource abundance may be conducive to
growth.
In order to find out what level of institutional quality as measured by economic
freedom is necessary for resources to further enhance growth, one can use equation 1 to
take the derivative of growth with respect to resource intensity. Given that the interaction
term is equal to the economic freedom score multiplied by resource intensity, we get the
following equation:
Growth = a0 + b1 EFNA + b2 Resource_Intensity + b3Resource_Intensity*EFNA + b4Z
If we take the derivative of growth with respect to resource intensity we get:
____∂ Growth____
∂ Resource Intensity

=

B2 + B3 EFNA

where B2 is the coefficient for the resource intensity variable and B3 is the coefficient for
the interaction term. By setting this equation equal to zero in order to find out the level
of economic freedom in which the effect of resource abundance on growth turns positive
we get the following:
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B2 + B3 EFNA = 0
We can then solve for economic freedom by subtracting B2 to the other side and dividing
both sides by B3, where we get:
EFNA = - B2 / B3
Using the results from Table 4.1 regression 1 we can see that the effect of resources on
growth turns positive when economic freedom rises above 6.22 (EFNA = - (0.1150 /
0.0185) = 6.22). The coefficient of the interaction term indicates that every one point
increase in economic freedom will increase the positive effect of resources on growth by
0.0185 percentage points.
In order to analyze this result the eight most resource abundant states are isolated
from the rest of the data. Three of these states (Alaska, Montana, and West Virginia)
have a level of economic freedom that is below 6.22 points on the 10 point scale, while
five of the states (Louisiana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming)
have an economic freedom level above 6.22 points. The five states with more economic
freedom average a growth rate that is 0.84% points higher than the three states with less
economic freedom over the time period from 1986 to 2005. This is a significant given
that the difference between the highest growth rate and the lowest growth rate across all
50 states for this time period was a mere 2.66 percentage points
With regards to the control variables, as expected initial income is negative and
significant supporting that convergence is taking place. Schooling has the expected
positive sign, but is insignificant. Investment and R&D both have an unexpected
negative sign, but both are insignificant. The variable measuring the openness of the
state’s economy has the expected positive and significant sign and this variable appears
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to have the greatest economic impact on growth. Those economies that are more open
and receive more net international migration relative to their population are experiencing
more growth. The coastal variable, which measures whether or not a state has a coast
line, has an unexpected negative sign, but is insignificant. The insignificance of the
coastal variable may be the result of the plethora of ocean navigable river systems in the
United States, an advantage of the U.S. that was highlighted by Gallup, Mellinger, and
Sachs (1998). Population density was found to be positive and significant in this case as
was the variable measuring climate indicating that those states with more temperate
climates and a higher number of people per square mile will experience greater growth.
However, the economic impact of these variables is very small. The model itself is
significant at the 1% level 12.
Only 49 states were included in regression 1 as Delaware was excluded due to
data limitations with regards to the research and development variable. Therefore, the
variable R&D was eliminated in order to include Delaware in the analysis and the results
are presented in regression 2. Without the inclusion of R&D, the model experiences a
significant decline in R-squared as growth is certainly dependent on research and
development which serves as a proxy for innovation. The interaction term, which is the
main variable of interest, remains positive and significant indicating that the main result
of the model, which is that only states with low economic freedom suffer from the
resource curse, holds when including all 50 states and excluding research and
development as an explanatory variable. The effect of economic freedom remains
positive, but loses its significance, while the effect of resource intensity on growth is still
12

Each table consists of 3 regressions. The first regression uses all control variables for 49 states, the
second regression eliminates R&D to include Delaware, and the third regresson uses a five year average
where possible.

84

negative and significant. Among the control variables, the variable for openness loses its
significance and the variable for schooling switches signs, but remains insignificant.
Regression 3 measures growth over the same period using a five year average
covering the time period from 1986-1991 for the variables EFNA, resource intensity,
initial income, investment, schooling, and population density in order to reduce the
possibility that an aberration in a single year was driving the results. A new interaction
term was also created using these new measures for economic freedom and resource
abundance. All other control variables remained the same. The results were largely
unchanged. The effect of economic freedom on growth remained positive, but did lose
some of its significance and the variable that measures schooling changed signs, but
remained insignificant. The interaction term, which remains the variable of interest, is
still significant at the 5% level and the model itself remains significant at the 1% level. 13
In order to differentiate between the importance of the effects of point and diffuse
resources, Table 4.2 presents the results of the model using only point resources (those
resources that are immobile and related to mining).

13

Given that the previous chapter shows a connection between resource endowment and the area 1 score of
economic freedom it may be necessary to run an interaction between resource intensity and each of the
three areas of economic freedom separately in 3 different regressions in order to determine if the interaction
between economic freedom and resources and its effect on development is determined only by its area 1
score. Upon running these regressions, the interaction term between resource intensity and area 1 and the
interaction between resource intensity and area 3 are both positive and significant. The interaction between
resource intensity and area 2 is positive, but not significant.
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Table 4.2: Point Resources
Dependant Variable:

Constant

The average annual growth rate in gsp per
capita from 1986-2005
(1)
(2)
(3)
16.7434***
10.2051
17.5845***
(4.95)
(1.52)
(5.05)

EFNA

0.1577**
(2.57)

0.1481**
(2.11)

0.1481*
(2.01)

Point Resources

-0.1221**
(2.25)

-0.1507*
(1.73)

-0.1949***
(2.75)

Interaction2

0.0188**
(2.52)

0.0210*
(1.82)

0.0275***
(2.83)

-1.4453***
(4.00)

-0.7254
(0.99)

-1.5045***
(4.01)

Investment

-0.0107
(0.30)

-0.0614
(1.16)

-0.0124
(0.39)

Schooling

0.0260
(0.24)

-0.0879
(0.53)

-0.0247
(0.22)

Openness

7.6785**
(2.44)

-0.3482
(0.05)

7.5795**
(2.16)

R&D

-0.0424
(1.26)

Coastal

-0.0749
(0.69)

-0.0583
(0.51)

-0.0481
(0.45)

Pop_Density

0.0004**
(2.08)

0.0004
(1.67)

0.0004**
(2.19)

Climate

0.0001***
(4.07)

0.0001***
(2.73)

0.0001***
(4.08)

Initial Income

-0.0437
(1.16)

observations
49
50
49
R2
0.5883
0.3696
0.5849
F-statistic
4.03***
3.91***
4.05***
Prob > F
0.0007
0.001
0.0006
Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis.
The symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
joint tests are significant. The Huber / White Sandwich estimator of variance was used
in every regression to report robust standard errors.
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This model is similar to that of equation 1, but only includes mining as a share of GSP
rather than all resources. The new interaction (Interaction2) term is formed by
multiplying the economic freedom score and this measure for point resource intensity.
The results from this analysis are very similar across all three specifications to the results
when all resources are used, indicating that most of the effect of the connection between
resources and institutions on growth is through point resources. The effect of institutions
on growth is still positive and significant, the effect of point resources on growth is still
negative and significant, and the interaction term is still positive and significant. There is
little change among the significance and impact of the control variables.
Table 4.3 presents the results of the model when only diffuse resources, which
include agriculture, forestry and fishing, are incorporated into the model.
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Table 4.3: Diffuse Resources
Dependant Variable:

Constant

EFNA

The average annual growth rate in gsp per
capita from 1986-2005
(1)
(2)
(3)
13.1656***
8.4449
13.4625***
(3.06)
(1.31)
(3.28)
0.1801**
(2.63)

0.1881**
(2.52)

0.2202***
(2.77)

Diffuse Resources

0.0908
(0.55)

0.0958
(0.54)

0.1958
(1.06)

Interaction3

-0.0063
(0.28)

-0.0053
(0.22)

-0.0205
(0.81)

Initial Income

-1.08**
(2.33)

-0.5787
(0.84)

-1.1327**
(2.58)

Investment

-0.0056
(0.18)

-0.0053
(0.22)

0.0011
(0.04)

Schooling

0.1083
(1.03)

0.0711
(0.53)

0.1220
(1.19)

Openness

4.824
(1.34)

-0.1048
(0.02)

5.3772
(1.50)

R&D

-0.0124
(0.36)

-0.0169
(0.49)

Coastal

-0.0766
(0.72)

-0.0594
(0.51)

-0.0533
(0.51)

Pop_Density

0.0004**
(2.37)

0.0005*
(2.01)

0.0004**
(2.54)

Climate

0.0001*
(1.75)

0.0001
(0.76)

0.0001*
(1.88)

observations
49
50
49
2
R
0.5761
0.3776
0.5699
F-statistic
6.59***
7.60***
5.40***
Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Absolute t-ratios for the independent variables are shown in parenthesis.
The symbols *,**,*** denote a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
The Huber / White Sandwich estimator of variance was used in every regression to report
robust standard errors.
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In this model, a third interaction term (Interaction3) is formed by multiplying the
economic freedom score and the measure for diffuse resource intensity, which is the
share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GSP. These diffuse resources are inherently
different from point resources in that they are more mobile and, therefore, can leave in
response to unfavorable government. The results are drastically different across all three
specifications when isolating the effect of the interaction between diffuse resources and
institutions on growth. Both the variable measuring diffuse resources and the interaction
term change signs and become insignificant, while the positive effect of economic
freedom on growth remains. Intuitively, it makes sense that point resources are the
driving force behind the connection between resource intensity and growth as the
immobility of these resources makes them more susceptible to government policy. This
is consistent with the result found by Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) at the
international level.

4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the effect of the relationship between resource intensity and
institutional quality on development at the state level. The fact that institutions are an
important factor in economic growth has been analyzed and confirmed across multiple
studies. The negative relationship between resource abundance and development, known
as the resource curse, has also been examined through various international, and more
recently, state-wide studies. Various possible causes of this inverse relationship have
been examined to find out how resources negatively impact growth and institutions have
been studied as a possible source of this correlation. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006)

89

used an interaction term to conclude that the resource curse only reared its ugly head in
nations with grabber-friendly institutions, while resources contributed to higher growth in
countries with producer-friendly institutions.
Using the methodology applied by Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) in
conjunction with the basic growth model analyzed by Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2006),
who were the first to examine the resource curse across U.S. states, this study concludes
that the resources only negatively effect growth in states with poor institutional quality
when using the Economic Freedom of North America Index as the measure for
institutional quality. This paper also further extends this analysis by showing that this
result is largely driven by point resources rather than diffuse resources. This can have
important policy implications as it shows that adopting policies more consistent with
economic freedom may be even more important for states with a considerable amount of
resources, especially if those resources are immobile. By enhancing economic freedom a
state can turn the resource curse into a blessing.
The final chapter offers a brief summary and lists some areas of future research
before providing some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Areas of Future Research

This dissertation has examined the connection between natural resource intensity,
institutions, and development across U.S. States. The idea that areas with greater natural
resource intensity tend to suffer from low levels of economic development known as the
resource curse has been widely examined at the international level. Only recently,
despite the many advantageous from doing so, has this connection been analyzed at the
sub-national level. In order to add to this limited literature, this dissertation explores the
institutional connection between natural resources and growth at the state level.
Chapter two examines the formation of governments with the idea that resources
may lead an area to initially have greater wealth which would result in the more rapid
formation of expropriative institutions that foster an economic environment that is not
consistent with further development. The chapter provides a simple theoretical model
that shows that governments will use more extractive tax policies in the presence of
immobile point resources due to the inability of these resources to leave when faced with
such policies. A case study on the resource rich state of Wyoming reveals a constitution
that is written around state government control, taxation, and regulation of the natural
resources found within the states. Empirical evidence further demonstrates that state
governments will form more quickly in those areas with a higher level of natural
resources due to the increased availability of wealth for the taking.
After having established the connection between resource intensity and the
formation of expropriative governments, chapter three analyzes the connection between
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resource intensity and the continued growth of these governments. Consistent with both
the international literature and the recent sub-national literature, the results of the
empirical model indicate that resource abundance is consistent with increased
government size and economic interference, which encourages an economic environment
consistent with rent-seeking and unproductive entrepreneurship. It is this type of
economic environment that slows development. These results are consistent across
multiple specification and measures for government size over the years 1986-2005.
Chapter four examines how the interaction between resources and institutions
influence economic development. Consistent with the international literature, this study
shows that those states with more productive high-quality institutions tend to benefit from
having natural resources while it is only those states with low-quality, grabber-friendly
institutions that suffer from the resource curse. Those states with high levels of economic
freedom, which indicates a government that encourages an economic environment
conducive to innovation, research and development, and productive forms of
entrepreneurship, will actually experience greater economic growth as a result of natural
resource abundance. This indicates that having free market policies consistent with the
ideals of capitalism is even more important in places with natural resource abundance so
that these areas can avoid the devastating effects of the resource curse.
The research performed in this dissertation has attempted to answer some
questions we have about our world, but, in doing so, has created others. For example, a
fascinating result has sprouted as a side effect of the examination of the main question of
interest when examining the determinants of government size. It is interesting to note
that the only political variable that was significant in this analysis was the average share
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of republicans in the house of representatives. Why the political parties of the senate and
the governor have less explanatory power in determining the size of government than the
political party of the members of the house of representatives is a research question
whose answer may enrich the fields of public choice economics and political science.
This dissertation provides an extensive look at the institutional connection
through which the resource curse operates at the sub-national level and provides a greater
understanding of this seemingly paradoxical economic phenomenon. However, the
examination of the resource curse across U.S. states is far from complete. The studies
within this dissertation show that low-quality institutions are more likely to form (and
form more rapidly), and once formed will grow larger and become more expropriative in
states with large amounts of natural resources. However, if a resource intense state can
avoid this tendency to develop and expand these unproductive institutions, then a state
with high-quality institutions can use resources for further growth and development. The
question remains how some states were able to avoid this initial tendency to form poor
institutions, and keep governments from growing to unproductive levels in order to
benefit from their resource endowment.
One possibility could be that states whose resources were already known and in
production at the time the state governments formed are more susceptible to institutions
forming around the expropriation of these immobile industries. States whose
governments formed before the knowledge of this resource wealth may not be as likely to
focus their policies on economic intervention in these resource sectors. Chapter 2, which
focuses on the state constitution of Wyoming, a resource intense state whose government
formed about 40 years after the discovery of natural resources, provides support for this
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possibility. It could also be possible that those states able to defeat the resource curse
just had a more economically enlightened population from which sprouted leaders with
the knowledge that economically free policies would result in greater long-term
development, and it was with this knowledge that they were able to avoid the temptations
of expropriating wealth from natural resources. This knowledge may help further
illuminate the answer for those states currently suffering from the resource curse so that
they, too, can adopt these free market policies which seems to be the method in which the
resource curse is lifted.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 2A: Variable List
Statehood: The year in which the state was admitted into the union (The Book of the
States).
Purchase: The year in which the territory which later became the respective state was
purchased by and/or ceded to the United States. (Data was found at the University of
Texas Libraries at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/histus.html)
Non-fuel Minerals: The value as represented in millions of dollars of all minerals
unrelated to the production of fuel in the year 2000. A complete list of all minerals
included in this measure can be found in Appendix B. (U.S. Census Bureau: Statistical
Abstracts of the U.S)
Coast: A dummy variable equal to 1 of the state has coastline that borders an ocean
and/or the Gulf of Mexico and equal to zero if the state is landlocked.
Coal: The number of long tons of coal produced in the year 1900 (U.S. Census Bureau:
Statistical Abstracts of the U.S).
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Appendix 2B: Non-fuel Minerals
Alphabetically listed below are all minerals that are contained within the variable labeled
non-fuel minerals.
Abrasives
Aluminum
Antimony
Arsenic
Asbestos
Barite
Bauxite
Beryllium
Bismuth
Boron
Bromine
Cadmium
Cement
Cesium
Chromium
Clays
Cobalt
Columbium
Copper
Diamond
Diatomite

Feldspar
Fluorspar
Gallium
Garnet
Gemstones
Germanium
Gold
Graphite
Gypsum
Hafnium
Helium
Indium
Iodine
Iron Ore
Iron and Steel
Kyanite
Lead
Lime
Lithium
Magnesium
Manganese

Mercury
Mica
Molybdenum
Nickel
Nitrogen
Peat
Perlite
Phosphate Rock
Platinum
Potash
Pumice
Quartz Crystal
Rare Earths
Rhenium
Rubidium
Salt
Sand and Gravel
Scandium
Selenium
Silicon
Silver

Soda Ash
Sodium Sulfate
Stone
Strontium
Sulfur
Talc
Tantalum
Tellurium
Thallium
Thorium
Tin
Titanium
Tungsten
Vanadium
Vermiculite
Yttrium
Zinc
Zirconium

Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Minerals Yearbook, annual and Mineral Commodities Summaries, annual.
See http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2003/mcs2003.pdf
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Appendix 3A: Description of the Data and its Sources
Area 1 score: The sub-national score for area 1 using the North American Economic
Freedom Index in 2005. 14
Resource Intensity: The share of the primary sector’s production (mining, agriculture,
forestry, and fishing) in GSP per state averaged over the years 1986-1990. 15
Resource Intensity (1986): The share of the primary sector’s production (mining,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing) in GSP per state in the year 1986.15
Point Resources: The share of mining in GSP per state averaged over the years 19861990.15
Point Resources (1986): The share of mining in GSP per state in the year 1986.15
Diffuse resources: The share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GSP per state
averaged over the years 1986-1990.15
Diffuse resources (1986): The share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GSP per state
in the year 1986.15
# Constitutions: This is the total number of state constitutions for each state. 16
Date of Present Constitution: this is the year in which the present state constitution is
effectively adopted.16
# of adopted amendments: this is the number of amendments that have been adopted to
the current state constitution.16
Statehood: This is the year that each state was admitted into the union.16
Share of Republicans in House: this is the number of republican members of the state
house of representatives divided by the total number of members in the state house of
representatives averaged over the years 1986-2005, where the data is available, for each
state.16
Share of Republicans in Senate: this is the number of republican members of the state
senate divided by the total number of members in the state senate averaged over the years
1986-2005, where the data is available, for each state.16
Governor: For each year that the governor is a republican, a value of 1 is recorded,
otherwise it is 0. These numbers are then averaged over the years 1986-2005.16
14

this data can be found at http://www.freetheworld.com/
this data can be found at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2007)
16
This data, when available, is from various editions of the Book of the States
15
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Area 1A score: Government general consumption expenditures as a share of GSP using
the North American Economic Freedom Index in 2005.14
Number of State Government Employees: the number of employees per 10,000 people in
the state population who work for the state government in each respective state in 2005. 17
Number of State and Local Government Employees: the number of employees per 10,000
people in the state population who work for the state government or local government in
each respective state in 2005.17

17

This data can be found at the U.S. Census Bureau
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Appendix 4A: Description of the Data and its Sources
Growth: Growth is equal to (ln(Y2005 /Y1986) / 19) x 100%. This is the average annual
growth rate in per capita GSP between 1986-2005. 18
EFNA:19 The sub-national composite score of the economic freedom index in1986. 19
Resource Intensity:19 The share of the primary sector’s production (mining, agriculture,
forestry, and fishing) in GSP per state in 1986.18
Point Resources:19 The share of mining in GSP per state in 1986.18
Diffuse Resources: 19 The share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GSP per state in
1986.
Interaction: this is the interaction term between the various measures of resources and
economic freedom used in the paper. For example, in regression 1 it is measured as
Resource_Intensity x EFNA.
Initial Income:19 The log of real GSP per capita in 1986.18
Investment:19 The share of industrial machinery production in GSP in 1986.18
Schooling:19 The contribution of educational services in GSP in 1986.18
R&D: The share of Research and Development in GSP for 1987. 20
Openness: Net international migration from 1990-1999 divided by the population in
1990 for each state. 21
Coastal: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has any coast line or equal to zero if
the state is landlocked.
Pop Density:19 The population divided by number of square miles in 1986.21
Climate: The average number of annual heating degree days from 1971 to 2000. 22

18

This data can be found at the Burea of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2007)
For the specifications indicated in the paper (regressions 3,6, and 9) these variables were calculated as
stated and then averaged over the time period for 1986-2005.
20
This data can be found at the National Science Foundation (NSF, 2003)
21
This was calculated using data available from the U.S. Census Bureau
22
This data can be found within the Historical Climatography Series No. 5-1 from the Department of
Commerce
19
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